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TERRITORIAL COURTS AND LAW 
UNIFYING FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN 
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
William Wirt Blume* and Elizabeth Gaspar Brown** 
Part II. INFLUENCES TENDING To UNIFY TERRITORIAL LAWf 
WITH the exception of Kentucky, Vermont, Texas, California, and West Virginia, all parts of continental United States 
south and west of the present boundaries of the original states 
came under colonial rule, and were governed from the national 
capital through territorial governments for varying periods of 
time. All territories in this area were "incorporated" in the sense 
that they were destined to become states of the United States. All 
became states by 1912, leaving only Alaska and Hawaii for future 
statehood. Now that these territories have become states, it seems 
desirable to review legal developments in all of these "incorpo-
rated" territories and to consider the territorial law that served 
as a basis for state law. Existing "unincorporated" territories will 
not be ignored, but in general the approach will be historical-
a discussion of the past without reference to the present. 
That the laws in force in a territory before its admission as a 
state would directly influence the constitution and laws of the 
particular state seems inevitable. In fact, the first constitutions of 
all of the states formed from territories, except Illinois and South 
Dakota, provided that laws in force not inconsistent with the con-
stitution should continue in force until expiration or repeal. The 
constitutions of Illinois and South Dakota continued "actions, 
prosecutions, claims." Some of the constitutions (Ohio, Washing-
ton, and Utah) declared that specified laws should not continue. 
To the extent the laws in force in the several territories were 
alike, the first laws in force in the states formed from the terri-
tories were alike. For illustration, the seventeen states formed 
from territories having the standardized judicial system described 
in part one of this article1 had court systems that were strikingly 
• Profesror of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
•• Research Asrociate in Law, University of Michigan Law School.-Ed. 
t Editor's Note.-Tbis is the second part of a two-part article with the general 
title Territorial Courts and Law: Unifying Factors in the Development of American 
Legal Institutions. Part I, Establishment of a Standardized Judicial System, appeared 
in the November 1962 issue, 61 MICH. L. REv. 39 (1962). 
1 Blume 8: Brown, Territorial Courts and Law: I, 61 MICH. L. REv. 39 (1962). 
[ 467] 
468 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
similar. Among the influences that tended to unify the law of the 
several territories, the following should be noted. 
1. The principal territorial officers were appointed by the 
President of the United States, the Senate consenting. Except for 
some early judges who were given "good behaviour" tenure, all 
were appointed for short terms and could be removed by the 
President. These officers, especially the governor, were expected 
to further national colonial policies. 
2. Congress had exclusive power to legislate for the territories, 
and in some instances served as the sole or principal legislative 
agency. It enacted a "charter" for each territory, and from time 
to time passed statutes applicable either to particular territories 
or to all the territories alike. The organic acts ("charters") fol-
lowed established patterns. 
3. The Supreme Court of the United States served as the high-
est court of appeal for territorial (state-type) as well as federal-type 
cases of all but the earliest territories. 
4. The territorial legislatures were authorized to adopt or 
enact statutes but were required to report them to Congress where 
they might be, and sometimes were, annulled. 
5. Some provisions of the federal constitution not applicable 
to states did apply to the territories. For example, all incorporated 
territories were required to provide jury trial for common law 
civil cases involving more than 20 dollars2-a requirement con-
tinued by state constitutions. 3 
6. Due to the practice of creating new territories out of old 
ones, law developed in one territory was in many instances trans-
2 In Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437 (1850), "an action of right" to recover 
a tract of "half-breed" land, Mr. Justice McLean stated: "By the seventh article of 
the amendments of the Constitution it is declared, 'In suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved.' The organic law of the Territory of Iowa, by express provision 
and by reference, extended the laws of the United States, including the Ordinance 
of 1787, over the Territory, so far as they are applicable. 
"The act under which the above proceeding was had prohibited the trial by jury 
in matters of fact on which the suits were founded. In this respect the act was void." 
Id. at 460. 
3 In Consolidated Gold & Sapphire Mining Co. v. Struthers, 41 Mont. 565, 571, 111 
Pac. 152, 155 (1910), Brantly, C.J., stated: "This court has repeatedly held that the 
right guaranteed by the state Constitution (Article III, sec. 23) is the same as that 
guaranteed by the federal Constitution (Seventh Amendment), because the federal 
Constitution was the fundamental law of the territory at the time it was admitted 
into the Union as a state, and the right as it then existed was preserved in the state 
Constitution." MoNT. CoNsr. art. III, § 23 (1889) begins: "The right of trial by jury 
shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate .••• " For other constitutional provisions 
continuing the right to jury trial as it existed in the territories, see BLUME, AMERICAN 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 370-71 (1955). 
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mitted to another, and sometimes to several territories m se-
quence.4 
7. Many persons served as officers of more than one territory, 
and in moving from one territory to another carried with them 
legal materials and knowledge of prior experience.5 
8. The continental territories were on the western frontier,6 
and were similarly influenced by the needs and pressures of fron-
tier life. 
LAW AND SOURCES OF LAW 
For purposes of the present study three somewhat controversial 
terms will be used: (1) statute law; (2) decisional law; and (3) 
source of law. 
I. Territorial statute law included the Constitution of the 
United States, treaties made by the United States, acts of Congress, 
territorial legislative acts, statutes of other governments re-enacted 
by express reference, and general rules of court. 
2. Territorial decisional law was made up of rules of decision 
adopted by territorial courts and by federal appellate courts in 
4 Illustration: From 1834 to 1836, Michigan Territory included the later territories 
of Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and the eastern half of the Dakotas. ·when Wisconsin 
Territory was organized (1836), Congress provided that "the existing laws" of Michigan 
should be extended over Wisconsin until altered or repealed. When Iowa Territory 
was created out of Wisconsin (1838), the "existing laws" of Wisconsin were likewise 
continued. When Minnesota Territory was organized (1849), the laws of Wisconsin 
of 1848 were continued. Codes of civil and criminal law prepared "from the Code of 
Iowa" were adopted in Jefferson Territory (later Colorado) in 1859. Specified laws 
of Iowa were adopted in Oregon. Beardsley, Code Making in Early Oregon, 27 P Ac. 
NORTHWEST Q. 1 (1936). General laws of Oregon were "declared to be the law" in 
Alaska in 1884. See Riesenfeld, Law-Making and Legislative Precedent in American 
Legal History, 33 MINN. L. REv. 103, 140 (1949) where footnote 260 reads: "For instance, 
most of the (revised) Statutes of the Territory of Wisconsin of 1839 are substantially 
identical with the (revised) Laws of the Territory of Michigan of 1833 and the acts 
passed until the separation." 
5 Typical instances: Winthrop Sargent, Secretary of Northwest 1788-1798, became 
the first governor of Mississippi Territory. William Henry Harrison, first governor of 
Indiana Territory, was Secretary of Northwest 1798-1799. He was delegate to Congress 
from Northwest at the time of his appointment as governor. John Griffin was an 
Indiana territorial judge before becoming a member of the Michigan territorial court. 
Frederick Bates, after serving as a Michigan territorial judge, was appointed Secretary 
of Louisiana Territory. Later, he was Secretary of Missouri Territory, and still later 
governor of the state. James Duane Doty, for a time clerk of the Michigan territorial 
court, and "additional judge" (1824-1832), was Wisconsin's first delegate to Congress. 
After serving as governor of Wisconsin Territory, he ended his career as governor of 
Utah. 
6 The "frontier" referred to here, and in other articles by Professor Blume dealing 
with territorial law, was the line of continuous settlements shown by official census 
returns through 1880. This was not a line between areas of law and no-law. Before 
permitting settlement in a new area Congress would establish a territorial government, 
and make provision for law and legal institutions. This was repeated many times as 
the line of continuous settlements moved westward. 
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territorial cases. These rules might or might not involve statute 
law. 
3. A source of territorial law was a system of law to which 
territorial courts were directed when neither the statute nor the 
decisional law provided a rule of decision. Whether legislative 
acts of other sovereignties were considered statute law, decisional 
law, or source of law will be noted in the course of the discussion. 
1. Statute Law 
Northwest Ordinance. Passed July 13, 1787,7 the Northwest 
Ordinance was amended in 17898 to conform to the later-adopted 
Constitution of the United States. As amended, the Ordinance 
was made applicable to all territorial governments organized in 
the area east of the Mississippi relinquished by Great Britain in 
1783. The acts organizing the territory south of the Ohio River 
(1790),9 Mississippi (1798),1° Indiana (1800),11 Michigan (1805),12 
and Illinois (1809)13 incorporated by express reference the pro-
visions of the Ordinance relating to the form of government. 
These acts and those creating Wisconsin (1836)14 and Oregon 
(1848)15 incorporated by express reference the bill of rights (Ar-
ticles) of the Ordinance except, in the southern territories, the 
provision against slavery. The Iowa and Minnesota acts (183816 
and 184911) indirectly incorporated the bill of rights by referring 
to Wisconsin. The Orleans act (1805)18 made similar reference to 
Mississippi. Alabama was formed from Mississippi in 1817.10 
7 Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a); also in 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 39 
(Carter ed. 1934) [hereinafter cited TERRITORIAL PAPERS]. 
s Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50. 
O Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § 1, 1 Stat. 123. 
10 Mississippi Territory Act of 1798, ch. 28, § 6, 1 Stat. 550. 
11 Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 2, 2 Stat. 59. 
12 Act of 1805 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 5, § 2, 2 Stat. 309. 
13 Act of 1809 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 13, § 2, 2 Stat. 515. 
14 Wisconsin Organic Act of 1836, ch. 54, § 12, 5 Stat. 15. 
15 Oregon Organic Act of 1848, ch. 177, § 14, 9 Stat. 329. 
16 Iowa Organic Act of 1838, ch. 96, § 12, 5 Stat. 239. 
17 Minnesota Organic Act of 1849, ch. 121, § 12, 9 Stat. 407. 
18 Ch. 23, § 2, 2 Stat. 322. 
10 Alabama Organic Act of 1817, ch. 59, 3 Stat. 371. It should be noted that the 
Ordinance of 1787, in addition to providing a form of government and a bill of 
rights, contained detailed provisions for transfer of property, wills, descent and dis-
tribution. After pointing out in 1824 that the Ordinance had been framed mainly 
from the laws of Massachusetts, especially in regard to titles, Nathan Dane wrote: 
"Thus the laws of Massachusetts laid the foundation of titles to real and personal 
estates, by deed, by will, and by descent, in all the territories of the Union, northwest 
of the river Ohio;-and substantially in other territories to which this ordinance has 
been extended." 7 DANE, A GENERAL .ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW !190 
(1824). That the property provisions of the Ordinance were extended to other territories 
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Federal Constitution. The Ordinance of 1787 preceded the 
Constitution of the United States, and the people of Northwest 
and of territories formed from Northwest often referred to the 
Ordinance as "our constitution." That the Constitution of the 
United States was also in force in these territories was not im-
mediately recognized. In the Louisiana Purchase, however, it was 
understood from the beginning that the Constitution was in force, 
the organic acts of 180420 providing that "no law shall be valid 
which is inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United 
States." Similar provisions will be found in the organic acts of 
Missouri (formed from the Louisiana Territory in 1812)21 and 
Arkansas (formed from Missouri Territory in 1819).22 
Commencing in 1850 Congress inserted in new organic acts 
a provision that the Constitution of the United States should have 
"the same force and effect" within the territory "as elsewhere 
within the United States." This language will be found in the 
organic acts of New Mexico (1850),23 Kansas (1854),24 Nebraska 
(1854),2is Colorado (1861),26 Dakota (1861),27 Nevada (1861),28 
Idaho (1863),29 Montana (1864),30 Wyoming (1868),31 Indian 
Territory (1890),32 Oklahoma (1890),33 Hawaii (1900),34 and 
Alaska (1912).3is By the Utah act of 185036 the Constitution was 
"extended over and declared to be in force in the said Territory." 
The Florida organic act of 182237 contained a provision, the 
same as in the early organic acts for the Louisiana area, that "no 
law shall be valid which is inconsistent with the constitution and 
is indicated by the fact that the Orleans Act of 1805 expressly excluded "the second 
paragraph of the said Ordinance, which regulates the descent and distribution of 
estates." For comments on the property provisions of the Ordinance, see Blume, Probate 
and Administration on the American Frontier, 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 209 (1959). 
20 Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 4, 2 Stat. 284. 
21 Missouri Organic Act of 1812, ch. 95, § 4, 2 Stat. 744. 
22 Arkansas Organic Act of 1819, ch. 49, § 5, 3 Stat. 494. 
23 New Mexico Organic Act of 1850, ch. 49, § 17, 9 Stat. 452. 
24 Nebraska-Kansas Act of 1854, ch. 59, § 32, IO Stat. 289. 
211 Ibid. 
26 Colorado Organic Act of 1861, ch. 59, § 16, 12 Stat. 176. 
27 Territory of Dakota Act of 1861, ch. 86, § 16, 12 Stat. 244. 
28 Nevada Organic Act of 1861, ch. 83, § 16, 12 Stat. 214. 
20 Idaho Organic Act of 1863, ch. 117, § 13, 12 Stat. 813. 
30 Montana Organic Act of 1864, ch. 95, § 13, 13 Stat. 91. 
31 Wyoming Organic Act of 1868, ch. 235, § 16, 15 Stat. 183. 
32 Oklahoma-Indian Territory Act of 1890, ch. 182, § 28, 26 Stat. 93. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Hawaiian Organic Act of 1900, ch. 339, § 5, 31 Stat. 141. 
SIS Alaska Government Act of 1912, ch. 387, § 3, 37 Stat. 512. 
S6 Utah Organic Act of 1850, ch. 51, § 17, 9 Stat. 458. 
37 Ch. 13, § 5, 3 Stat. 655. 
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laws of the United States." Commencing in 1849 the provmon 
usually inserted was "the legislative power of the Territory shall 
extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, consistent with the 
Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act .... " 
A provision that specified territorial officers should take an 
oath to support the Constitution appears in most of the organic 
acts commencing in 1804. Provisions that specified territorial 
courts should have jurisdiction in cases arising under the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States were also usual. 
In the development of territorial government it became settled 
that the Constitution should have the same force within the "in-
corporated territories" as elsewhere within the United States. How 
far it should be deemed applicable to "unincorporated territories" 
became a mooted question, often considered, but still unsettled.38 
United States Treaties. The acts of Congress organizing terri-
torial governments did not expressly provide that treaties of the 
United States should have force within the territories. The Con-
stitution was made applicable, and this was all that was needed. 
Statutes applicable to all the territories passed in 188539 and 189140 
regulated appeals and writs of error from territorial courts to 
federal appellate courts in cases involving the "validity" or "con-
struction" of a treaty of the United States. The Canal Zone Act 
of 1912 provided: 
"[A]ll laws and treaties relating to the extradition of persons 
accused of crime in force in the United States, to the extent 
that they may not be in conflict with or superseded by any 
special treaty entered into between the United States and the 
Republic of Panama with respect to the Canal Zone, ... 
shall extend to and be considered in force in the Canal Zone, 
and for such purposes and such purposes only the Canal Zone 
38 In Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955), Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
observed: "A vital distinction was made between 'incorporated' and 'unincorporated' 
territories. The first category had the potentialities of statehood like unto continental 
territories. The United States Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, fully applied 
to an 'incorporated' territory. See, e.g., Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 25 
S. Ct. 514, 49 L. Ed. 862. The second category described possessions of the United States 
not thought of as future States. To these only some essentials, withal undefined, of the 
Constitution extended. See, e.g., Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S. Ct. 
343, 66 L. Ed. 627. The incidence of the differentiation fell in two areas: (a) the right 
of the individual to trial by jury and similar protections, e.g., Balzac v. People of Porto 
Rico, supra; (b) the right of the Federal Government to tax territorial products on a 
nonuniform basis, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S. Ct. 770, 45 L. Ed. 1088." 
Id. at 5. 
39 Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 355, § 2, 23 Stat. 443. 
40 Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, §§ 5, 15, 26 Stat. 827, 830. 
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shall be considered and treated as an organized Territory of 
the United States .... "41 
In 1807 the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the property 
provisions of Jay's Treaty (concluded in 1794, proclaimed in 
1796) protected property rights in slaves despite the anti-slavery 
provision of the Northwest Ordinance made applicable to Michi-
gan in 1805.42 
Acts of Congress. The power of Congress to "make all need-
ful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Prop-
erty belonging to the United States"43 was exercised in three ways: 
(1) by enacting statutes for particular territories or all territories 
alike; (2) by extending statutes enacted for the country at large 
to all or to particular territories; and (3) by delegating to a terri-
torial legislature the power to adopt laws for the territory. 
Commencing in 1850 new organic acts provided that "all laws 
of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have 
the same force and effect within the said Territory ... as elsewhere 
within the United States."44 Many organic acts before and after 
1850 specified some or all of the acts of Congress that were to be 
considered in force, or not in force. The most extensive lists will 
be found in the organic acts for the Louisiana area (1804)45 and 
for Florida (1822).46 In 1849 "the revenue laws of the United 
States" were "extended to and over the main land and waters of 
all that portion of territory ... known as Upper California."47 
Other types of provisions showing that "applicable" laws of Con-
gress were in force were those requiring that local territorial laws 
be consistent with the laws of the United States; requiring oaths 
to support the laws of the United States; and conferring jurisdic-
tion of causes arising under the laws of the United States. 
State Statutes. The organic act (1790) for the area south of 
the Ohio later known as Tennessee provided that the laws of 
North Carolina should continue in force in the Territory until 
altered or repealed.48 In 1884, the "general laws of the State of 
41 Ch. 390, § 12, 37 Stat. 569. 
42 Opinion by Woodward, C.J., recorded in the court's journal, printed in I 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at 
385-95 (Blume ed. 1935). 
48 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
44 E.g., New Mexico Organic Act of 1850, ch. 49, § 17, 9 Stat. 452; Utah Organic Act 
of 1850, ch. 51, § 17, 9 Stat. 458. 
41S Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 7, 2 Stat. 285 (listing twenty-one acts). 
46 Florida Organic Act of 1822, ch. 13, § 9, 3 Stat. 657 (listing twenty-four acts). 
47 Act of March 3, 1849, ch. 112, § 1, 9 Stat. 400. 
48 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § 1, I Stat. 123, incorporating conditions of Act of 
April 2, 1790, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 106. 
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Oregon" were declared to be the law of Alaska so far as applica-
ble and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States.411 
Specified "general laws of the State of Arkansas" were made ap-
plicable to Indian Territory in 1890.50 At the same time specified 
"Laws of the State of Nebraska," so far as locally applicable and 
not in conflict with the laws of the United States, were "extended 
to and put in force in the Territory of Oklahoma" until after 
the first session of the legislature. 51 
Territorial Statutes. Each completely organized territory was 
provided with a legislative agency to which Congress delegated 
power to adopt or enact statutes for the territory.52 The extent of 
the legislative power of these agencies will be noted later.53 Acts 
of these agencies constituted substantial bodies of statute law.G4 
When Indiana was formed from Northwest in 1800, it was as-
sumed that the general statutes of Northwest continued in force.65 
In Michigan the opposite was assumed, until the Supreme Court 
held in 1806 that the general statutes of Indiana (including those 
received by Indiana from Northwest) were in force.56 In 1810, 
however, all prior territorial statutes were repealed.57 Altogether 
twelve territories were formed from pre-existing territories, and 
in each instance the laws of the older territory were continued 
in force: 
49 Act Providing Civil Government for Alaska, ch. 53, § 7, 23 Stat. 25 (1884). 
50 Oklahoma-Indian Territory Act of 1890, ch. 182, § 31, 26 Stat. 94-. 
51 Oklahoma-Indian Territory Act of 1890, ch. 182, § 11, 26 Stat. 87. 
52 Governor and judges: Northwest 1787-1798; South of river Ohio 1790-1794; 
Mississippi 1798-1800; Indiana 1800-1804; Louisiana (north of Orleans) 1804-1812; 
Michigan 1805-1823; Illinois 1809-1812; Arkansas 1819. Governor and council: Orleans 
1804-1805; Florida 1822-1845; Michigan 1823-1836. Legislature (governor, council, and 
representatives): Northwest 1799-1802; South 1794-1796; Mississippi 1800-1817; Indiana 
1804-1816; Orleans 1805-1812; Missouri 1812-1821; Illinois 1812-1818; Alabama 1817• 
1819; Arkansas 1819-1836. Governor and legislature (council and representatives): Wis• 
consin 1836-1848; Iowa 1838-1846; Minnesota 1849-1858; New Mexico 1850-1912; Utah 
1850-1896; Kansas 1854-1861; Nebraska 1854-1867; Colorado 1861-1876; Nevada 1861-
1864; Dakota 1861-1889; Idaho 1863-1890; Montana 1864-1889; Wyoming 1868-1890; 
Oklahoma 1890-1907. Legislature (council or senate and representatives): Oregon 1848· 
1859; Washington 1853-1889; Arizona 1863-1912; Alaska 1912-1959; Puerto Rico 1900· 
1952; Hawaii 1900-1959; Philippines 1902-1935. Legislature (one house): Guam 1950--; 
Virgin Islands 1954-. 
53 See text at 523-31 infra. 
54 See descriptions of laws adopted by governor and judges of Northwest 1788-1798; 
Indiana 1800-1804; and Michigan 1805-1823 in Blume, Legislation on the American 
Frontier, 60 MICH. L. REv. 317 (1962). 
55 1 COURTS AND LAWYERS OF INDIANA 22 (Monks ed. 1916); LAws OF INDIANA T.EIUU• 
TORY 1801-1809, at cii-cvi (Philbrick ed. 1930). 
56 United States v. Muir (1806), reported in 1 TRANSAcrIONS OF THE SUPREME CoUllT 
OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at 58 (Blume ed. 1935). 
57 1 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 900 (reprint 1871). 
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Indiana from Northwest (1800) 
Michigan from Indiana (1805) 
Illinois from Indiana (1809) 
Missouri from Louisiana (north of Orleans) (1812) 
Alabama from Mississippi (1817) 
Arkansas from Missouri (1819) 
Wisconsin from Michigan (1836) 
Iowa from Wisconsin (1838) 
Minnesota from Wisconsin (1849) 
Washington from Oregon (1853) 
Arizona from New Mexico (1863) 
Wyoming from Dakota (1868) 
475 
General Court Rules. In 1800 the General Assembly of North-
west made it the duty of the judges of the General Court "to com-
pile a system of rules for the government of the general and circuit 
courts."58 The act recited that it was passed "for the purpose of 
establishing and maintaining an uniformity in the practice of the 
several courts throughout the territory."59 The rules were to be 
consistent with "the constitution, laws and ordinances of the 
United States and the acts of this territory." In the later territories 
grant of rule-making power to the highest court was usual, but 
in most instances the court was not authorized to make rules for 
other courts. 60 In all instances the rules were to be consistent with 
federal and territorial legislative acts. "A Digest of the Rules of 
the Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan" was published 
in 1821.61 In 1863 the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that a territorial court sitting in chancery was governed by the 
same statutes and court rules as governed the federal courts. 62 This 
was overruled in 1874,63 but whether a territorial court sitting to 
try federal-type cases was governed by federal rules was left un-
decided. In Washington it was held in 1877 " ... that the rules 
in admiralty, promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United 
States as far as they can be applied, are to regulate the procedure 
in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the courts of 
this Territory."64 
58 1 STATUTES OF OHIO AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY 307 (Chase ed. 1833). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Territorial provisions for rule-making have been assembled by Mrs. Brown, and 
appear in Laws in Force in the Territories of the United States 1787-1912 (unpublished 
mimeograph in the University of Michigan Law Library, 1955). 
61 Reprinted in 2 TRANSAcrIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF 
MICHIGAN 1814-1824, at 515-32 (Blume ed. 1938). 
62 Orchard v. Hughes, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 73 (1863). 
63 Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648 (1874). 
64 Phelps v. S.S. City of Panama, 1 Wash. Terr. 518, 530 (1877). 
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Acts of Temporary Governments. The governments of all "in-
corporated" territories were "temporary" in the sense that sooner 
or later the territories would become states. As here employed, the 
term "temporary" is used to describe military and other interim 
governments which preceded governments of the type provided 
by the Northwest Ordinance. Temporary governments were pro-
vided by the United States for: 
Louisiana (1803-1804) 
Florida (1821-1822) 
New Mexico (1846-1850) 
Hawaii (1898-1900) 
Philippines (1898-1901) 
Puerto Rico (1898-1900) 
Guam (1898-1950) 
Samoa (1900--) 
Canal Zone (1904--) 
Virgin Islands (1917-1936) 
Trust Territory (1947--) 
In addition to the military and other interim governments estab-
lished by the United States, temporary or provisional governments 




The act of Congress organizing Oregon as a territory (1848) pro-
vided that the laws of the provisional government should continue 
in force. 65 The first legislature of the territory of Utah (1851) de-
clared "that the laws heretofore passed by the provisional govern-
ment of the State of Deseret," not in conflict with the organic act, 
were "legal" and should remain in force. 66 
In this connection, attention is called to acts of Congress (1866 
and 1872)67 authorizing exploration and occupation of mineral 
lands of the public domain subject to "the local customs or rules 
of miners in the several mining districts." The Act of 1872 further 
provided that: 
65 Oregon Organic Act of 1848, ch. 177, § 14, 9 Stat. 329. 
66 For pre-territorial developments in Utah, see The State of Deseret 1847-1849, in 8 
UTAH HISTORICAL Q. 67 (1940). For details of pre-territorial military governments, see 
THOMAS, A HISTORY OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN NEWLY ACQUIRED TERRITORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1904). 
67 Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 1, 14 Stat. 251; Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 1, 
17 Stat. 91. 
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"[T]he miners of each mining district may make rules and 
regulations not in conflict with the laws of the United States, 
or with the laws of the State or Territory in which the dis-
trict is situated, governing the location, manner of recording, 
amount of work necessary to hold possession of a mining-
claim, subject to the following requirements . . . " 68 
2. Decisional Law 
Each territorial government of the type provided by the North-
west Ordinance included at least three judges appointed by the 
national government. These judges constituted the highest court 
of the territory, and had jurisdiction of both state-type and federal-
type cases. Appeals to federal appellate courts were allowed-at 
first, in cases which concerned the United States; later, in state-
type cases involving fixed jurisdictional amounts. The several 
territorial governments commenced operations with the statutory 
law outlined above but without common law of any kind. The 
latter had to be built up item by item through court decisions. 
Judge Sibley of Michigan once remarked: 
"The courts are constantly drawing from the same foun-
tain in aid of their adjudications or questions as they arise-
The right to draw upon the common law is admitted, and 
may be carried to the extent of introducing the entire body 
of that Law, if the interest and convenience of the new society 
require it."69 
How far the courts of any one territory went in introducing 
law other than statutory law cannot be determined from the mate-
rials which have survived.70 
3. Source of Law 
Quebec Act (1774 ). The Quebec Act of 1774 provided that the 
area later organized as the Northwest Territory should be annexed 
to and made part and parcel of the Province of Quebec, and 
68 Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 5, 17 Stat. 92. See SHINN, MINING CA.MPs-A STUDY 
IN AMERICAN FRONTIER GOVERNMENT (reprint 1948). 
69 Chene v. Campau (1828), reported in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1825-1836, at 305, 311 (Blume ed. 1940). 
70 There are no reports of cases decided in the early territories. Even the records 
of the Northwest General Court have disappeared. Diligent efforts made some years ago 
to locate opinions delivered by the judges of the Michigan Supreme Court (1805-1836) 
uncovered some one hundred opinions, but there was no assurance that all, or approxi-
mately all, had been discovered. The judges, it seems, would deliver oral opinions from 
notes or from completely written manuscripts. In some instances written opinions were 
recorded in the court's journal; a few were deposited in the court's files; a few were 
published in local newspapers. Usually, the judge retained his notes or manuscript 
with his own personal papers. 
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"in all Matters of Controversy, relative to Property and 
Civil Rights, Resort shall be had to the Laws of Canada, as 
the Rule for the Decision of the same; and all Causes that 
shall hereafter be instituted in any of the Courts of Justice, 
to be appointed within and for the said Province ... shall, 
with respect to such Property and Rights be determined 
agreeably to the said Laws and Customs of Canada, until 
they shall be varied or altered by any Ordinance that shall, 
from Time to Time, be passed in the said Province . . . . 
"[I]t shall and may be lawful to and for every Person that 
is Owner of any Lands, Goods, or Credits, in the said prov-
ince, and that has a Right to alienate the said Lands, Goods, 
or Credits, in his or her Lifetime, by Deed of Sale, Gift, or 
otherwise, to devise and bequeath the same at his or her 
Death, by his or her last Will and Testament; any Law, 
Usage, or Custom, heretofore or now prevailing in the Prov-
ince, to the Contrary hereof in any-wise notwithstanding; 
such Will being executed, either according to the Laws of 
Canada, or according to the Forms prescribed by the Laws 
of England. 
"And whereas the Certainty and Lenity of the Criminal 
Law of England, and the Benefits and Advantages resulting 
from the Use of it, have been sensibly felt by the Inhabitants, 
from an Experience of more than Nine Years, during which 
time it has been uniformly administered; be it therefore 
further enacted .... That the same shall continue to be ad-
ministered, and shall be observed as Law in the Province 
of Quebec, as well in the Description and Quality of the 
Offence as in the Method of Prosecution and Trial; and the 
Punishments and Forfeitures thereby inflicted to the Ex-
clusion of every other Rule of Criminal Law, or Mode of 
Proceeding thereon .... " 71 
Northwest 1788-1802. The Northwest Ordinance (1787)72 con-
ferred on the superior judges "a common law jurisdiction," and 
declared that the inhabitants of the Territory should "always be 
entitled to the benefits of ... judicial proceedings according to the 
course of the common law," saving "to the French and Canadian 
inhabitants, and other settlers of the Kaskaskies, Saint Vincents, and 
the neighbouring villages" who had theretofore professed them-
selves citizens of Virginia, "their laws and customs now in force 
71 Quebec Act of 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 83. For the "Laws and Customs of Canada," 
referred to in the act, see AN .ABSTRACT OF THOSE p ARTS OF THE CUSTOM OF THE VIS• 
COUNTY PROVOSTSHIP OF PARIS, WHICH WERE RECEIVED AND PRACTICED IN THE PROVINCE 
OF QUEBEC, IN THE TIME OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT (1772). 
72 Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a). 
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among them, relative to descent and conveyance of property."73 
The "laws and customs" referred to were those of Canada made ap-
plicable to the northwest area by the Quebec Act of I 774, in-
cluding those parts of the Custom of Paris which had been in 
force in Canada under the French. How long these "laws and 
customs" were to be in force in the territories organized in the 
northwest area is not stated. Governor St. Clair of Northwest un-
derstood they were to continue only until territorial property 
laws were adopted or made.74 
In a report to President Washington (1789) the Governor, 
after describing settlements made and to be made in Northwest, 
observed: 
"Laws that are to run thro' so great an extent of Country, 
and are to operate upon People who have very many different 
Habits and Customs require to be very attentively considered; 
and it would seem that they should be composed rather of an 
intermixture of those of all the original states, than that the 
acts of any one particular state should be adopted."75 
His views as to what "common law" should guide the legal opera-
tions of the judges had been expressed a year earlier.76 It was his 
opinion that the common law of England, insofar as it had not 
been altered by statute prior to the Revolution, or by the laws 
of the colonies before that period, or by law of the states after-
wards, was the common law of the land. As to English statutes 
which had altered the common law, the governor was of the opin-
ion that if such statutes had been adopted in the colonies and had 
not been abrogated in the states after the Revolution, they con-
tinued to be the law. The superior judges had been discussing 
"the common law, as adopted in the States, while colonies."77 
In 1795 the governor and judges as a legislature adopted a 
statute which provided: 
"The common law of England, all statutes or acts of the 
British parliament made in aid of the common law, prior 
73 Ibid. 
74 Letter of Oct. 7, 1795, to Probate Judges William St. Clair and John Edgar, 3 
TERRITORIAL PAPERS 443. 
711 Letter of Aug. 1789, to the President, 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 204, 206. 
76 Letter of Aug. 2, 1788, to Judges Parsons and Varnum, 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 272, 
276; 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 72, 76 (Smith ed. 1882). 
77 Letter to Gov. St. Clair, 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 71 (Smith ed. 1882): "Were we 
to be confined for any length of time to the principles of the common law, we are 
fearful of very precarious consequences. The common law, as adopted in the States, 
while colonies, entered essentially into the principles of monarchial government, and 
therefore cannot, with propriety, be applied here." 
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to the fourth year of the reign of King James the first (and 
which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom) 
and also the several laws in force in this Territory, shall be 
the rule of decision, and shall be considered, as of full force, 
until repealed by legislative authority, or disapproved of by 
congress."78 
This was the Virginia Ordinance of 177679 which had been re-
pealed in 179280 after a program initiated by Jefferson had re-
sulted in a rewriting of all British statutes whose retention was 
deemed desirable.81 In 1799 Governor St. Clair suggested that all 
British statutes that were in force in the colonies down to the time 
of the Revolution should be declared the laws of the Northwest 
Territory.82 
By the law adopted in 1795 no particular British statute was 
made a Northwest statute. Without further specification by the 
legislature, the courts were to decide in cases before them what 
British statutes should be applied. The legislature did not re-
enact British statutes deemed desirable, nor did it undertake to 
list the statutes to be applied, but did pass the following acts:83 
November 15, 1789: Repeals law of 1795 insofar as it enforces 
13 Eliz. 1, c. 8, and 37 Hen. 8, c. 9, re usury. 
December 2, 1799: Repeals law of 1795 insofar as it adopts 
and enforces 43 Eliz. 1, c. 6, § 2, re costs in actions for less 
than 40s. 
December 6, 1800: Repeals law of 1795 insofar as it "adopts 
78 1 THE STATUTES OF Omo AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY 190 (Chase ed. 
1833) [hereinafter cited as CHASE]; LAws OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY 1788-1800, at 
253 (Pease ed. 1925) [hereinafter cited as PEASE]. 
79 This ordinance reads: "[T]he common law of England, all statutes or acts of 
Parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of 
King James the first, and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom, 
together with the several acts of the General Assembly of this colony now in force, so 
far as the same may consist with the several ordinances, declarations, and resolutions of 
the General Convention, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as in 
full force, until the same shall be altered by the legislative power of this colony." 1 
THE REvISED CODE OF THE LAws OF VIRGINIA 135 (1819). 
80 Id. at 137. After reciting that "the good people of this Commonwealth may be 
ensnared by an ignorance of acts of parliament, which have never been published in 
any collection of the laws," the General Assembly enacted: "That so much of the above 
recited ordinance as relates to any statute or act of parliament, shall be, and is hereby 
repealed; and that no such statute or act of parliament shall have any force or 
authority within this Commonwealth." Ibid. 
81 For The Revisal of the Laws 1776-1786, see 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
305-665 (Boyd ed. 1950). 
82 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 456 (Smith ed. 1882). 
83 See 1 CHASE 218, 238, 293; PEASE 353, 401. See also OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS PRIOR TO 1823, at 211 (Pollack ed. 1952). 
1963] TERRITORIAL COURTS AND LAW 481 
statutes that come within the purview of this act," re mainte-
nance and support of illegitimate children. 
That English law was to be the source of Northwest decisional 
law was clear; but the question was whether it should be law in 
force in England, or English law as adopted in the colonies and 
original states. Though Governor St. Clair signed the law of 1795, 
he preferred American common law of 1776 to that of England of 
1607, and visualized an "intermixture" of the laws of all the states. 
But by selecting the English law of 1607 the difficulty of trying to 
determine what law had been developed in each of the original 
colonies and states could be avoided. Equipped with books on 
English law, judges and lawyers began the process of developing 
an American common law that was unrelated to the common law 
of the colonies and original states. 
The first constitution of Ohio-created out of Northwest in 
1802-declared that "all laws, and parts of laws, now in force in 
this territory, not inconsistent with this constitution, shall con-
tinue and remain in full effect until repealed by the Legislature" 
except specified statutes dealing with attorneys.84 In 1804 the 
legislature repealed the Northwest act of 1795 (Virginia Ordi-
nance of 1776), enacting in its place a statute that was substantially 
the same.85 The latter was repealed in 1806.86 That this repeal 
eliminated all British statutes except those so incorporated into 
the common law "as to have become part and parcel of the sys-
tem" was held by the Supreme Court of Ohio· in 1848.87 That the 
repeal also eliminated the common law was argued in a book 
published in 1819.88 Holding the other way in 1817 the court of 
Common Pleas had referred to the Articles of Compact of the 
Northwest Ordinance as being of "perpetual obligation."89 
84 Omo CoNsr., § 4 of the Schedule (1802). 
85 1 CHASE 484 (1804 ed.), and id. at 512 (1805 ed.). 
80 l id. 528 (1805 ed.). 
87 Crawford v. Chapman, 17 Ohio St. 449, 453 (1848). 
88 GOODENOW, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES A..'ID ?i.fAx.IMS OF AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE IN CONTRAsr WITH THE DOCTRINES OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAw ON THE 
SUBJECT OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1819). In the preface Goodenow stated: "I have 
intended to establish these positions: that the common law of England had its origin, 
and received its impression and 'perfection' even down to the time when our ancestors 
left England, in dark, uncultivated and barbarous ages; suited to an ignorant and 
blood-thirsty people; under the tutilage of turbulent, haughty, sacrilegious tyrants 
and dictators; that as a code, separate from STATUTE LAW, it is without beauty, 
symmetry, or even shape; undefinable and immeasureable; bloody in its maxims; in• 
human in its policy; and entirely diverse and repugnant to the philosophy and christian 
refinement of this country." 
89 Ohio v. Lafferty, Tappan's Ohio R. 81 (1817). Judge Tappan observed that 
common law had been "modified and adapted to various forms of government; as the 
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South of Ohio (1790-1796). In the act organizing a territorial 
government for the area south of the Ohio (later Tennessee) ceded 
to the United States by North Carolina, Congress incorporated 
by reference a provision of the deed of cession90 that "the laws 
in force and use in the State of North Carolina, at the time of 
passing this act, shall be, and continue in full force within the 
territory hereby ceded, until the same shall be repealed, or other-
wise altered by the legislative authority of the said territory."91 
Among the laws continued in force was an act passed in I 71592 
declaring that the common law ( except writ practice) and English 
statutes dealing with specified subjects were in force, and an act 
passed in 177893 declaring in force all statutes and parts of the 
common law formerly in force and use, or such parts as were 
not inconsistent with the principles and form of government. 
In 1805 the Supreme Court of Tennessee pointed out that con-
struction of the act of 1715 "depended very much upon usage 
and the decisions of the superior courts"; and that "information 
on this subject is wanting."94 The court also found it impossible 
to give a "satisfactory opinion" with respect to what parts of the 
statutes of England were "in force and use" prior to the act of 
1778. The court did find it possible to specify which English stat-
utes were not inconsistent with the principles and form of govern-
ment. Giving effect to this alternative of the act of 1778, the court 
declared that "the statutes contemplated by the act, were those 
which were passed previously to the fourth year of Jae. 1st. when 
the charter to the colony of Virginia was granted, which included, 
what was afterwards called North-Carolina." 
Mississippi (1798-1817). By the organic act of 1798°5 the peo-
ple of Mississippi (south of Tennessee) were to "enjoy all and 
singular the rights, privileges and advantages" granted to the 
people of Northwest by the Ordinance of 1787, including "judi-
cial proceedings according to the course of the common law."96 
As was true of the Northwest, Congress did not specify what 
different orders of architecture, having their foundation in utility and graceful propor-
tion, rise in various forms of symmetry, and beauty, in accordance with the taste and 
judgment of the builder." Id. at 83. GoonENow, op. cit. supra note 88, was written to 
refute the Lafjerty case. 
90 Act of 1790 to Accept a Cession of North Carolina Claims, ch. 6, I Stat. 106. 
91 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § I, I Stat. 123. 
92 LAws OF NORTH CAROLINA 17 (Iredell ed. 1791). 
93 Id. at 353. 
94 Glasgow's Lessee v. Smith &: Blackwell, I Tenn. (Overton) 144, 153 (1805). 
95 Mississippi Territory Act of 1798, ch. 28, § 6, I Stat. 550. 
96 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, I Stat. 51 n.(a). 
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"common law" should be the rule of decision, leaving this to be 
worked out by the territorial government. In 1807, after Judge 
Toulmin had included in a digest of the territorial law a selection 
of English statutes, the territorial Assembly declared that "all 
laws of the Governor and Judges, all the acts of the General As-
sembly of the Mississippi Territory, and all statutes of England 
and Great-Britain, not contained in the said volume of statutes, 
shall cease to have any force or validity in this territory."97 In 
1849 the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi observed: 
"When the Mississippi territory was organized, the ordi-
nance secured the inhabitants in the enjoyment of judicial 
proceedings, according to the course of the common law. 
. . . This, together with the provision in the constitution 
[ continuing in force territorial laws], has been considered 
to exclude all English statutes, and to adopt only the com-
mon law, and the statutes of our own government .... "98 
In a later case (1856) it was said: "As early as the year 1807, all 
the statutes of England and Great Britain not re-enacted, were, by 
express enactment of the legislature, excluded from operation 
within the territory."09 In a much later case (1906) it was said: 
"English statutes have no force in this state since the act of 
1807 .... Even the common law has no force where not adapted 
to 'our institutions and circumstances.' "100 The court held that 
the particular common law to be applied in the case was the "an-
cient" common law as it existed prior to the first English statute 
changing it. On rehearing this view was repudiated, the court 
holding that a principle of liability first announced in an English 
statute not re-enacted in Mississippi could be applied by the courts 
as part of the English common law. 
Indiana (1800-1816). The act101 creating Indiana out of North-
west (1800) incorporated by reference the provisions of the North-
west Ordinance (1787) conferring "common law jurisdiction" 
to be exercised "according to the course of the common law." 
After a short period of doubt,1°2 it was recognized that the laws of 
97 STATUTES OF MISSISSIPPI TERRITORY 19 (Toulmin ed. 1807). 
98 Boarman v. Catlett, 21 Miss. (13 S. &: M.) 149, 152 (1849). 
oo Jordan v. Roach, 32 Miss. 481, 616 (1856). 
100 Moss Point Lumber Co. v. Harrison County, 89 Miss. 448, 505-06, 42 So. 290, 
293 (1906). 
101 Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 2, 2 Stat. 59. 
102 See letter of Aug. 26, 1800, from Secretary of State Marshall to President Adams, 
7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 18. 
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Northwest continued in force103 including the act of 1795 (Vir-
ginia Ordinance of 1776) and the repeals of 1799104 declaring 
what English law should be "the rule of decision." In 1801 the 
English statutes of Jeofails as of 1752 were declared to be in 
force.105 In 1807106 the legislature re-enacted the Northwest statute 
of 1795 excepting the English statutes repealed in 1799.107 In 
1814 the legislature called on Congress to clarify the term "com-
mon law" as used in the Northwest Ordinance, saying: 
"If it should be determined that, by the expression of 
the ordinance, a common law jurisdiction should be located 
on the common law of England, it is essential to define to 
what extent of that common law the judges shall take cog-
nizance; whether the whole extent of feudal and gothic 
customs of England; whether the customs, or unwritten law 
shall be taken with the statute law, and that to form the com-
mon law to govern the judges; or whether the unwritten 
and statute law is to be taken in contradistinction to the 
laws, customs, and rules of chancery; or whether it includes 
that law which is common to all."108 
Failure of Congress to comply with this request, coupled with 
its failure to disapprove the acts of Northwest and Indiana based 
on the1 Virginia Ordinance of 1776, indicated a willingness on the 
part of Congress to leave the matter to the local government. 
After the first constitution of Indiana (1816) had continued 
in force "all laws and parts of law now in force in this Terri-
tory,"109 the state legislature re-enacted the territorial law of 1807 
(originally the Virginia Ordinance of 1776).110 This re-enactment 
was declared in force in 1838111 and appears in the present stat-
utes.112 "But," stated the Supreme Court in 1914,113 "this provision 
of our law has not had the effect of making English statutes, passed 
subsequent to 1607, a part of the body of our law." 
103 See note 55 supra. 
104 The English statutes "repealed" in 1799 were: 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545) (relating to 
usury); 13 Eliz. 1, c. 8 (1571) (relating to usury); 43 Eliz. 1, c. 6, § 2 (1601) (relating 
to frivolous suits). 
105 LAws OF INDIANA TERRITORY 1801-1809, at 7 (Philbrick ed. 1930). This act was 
repealed in 1803. Id. at 64. 
106 Id. at 323. 
107 See note 104 supra. 
10s ANNALS OF CONG., 13th Cong., 3d Sess. 401 (1854). 
109 IND. CONST. art. 12, § 4 (1816). 
110 THE REvISED LAws OF INDIANA 256 (1824). 
111 THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 398 (1838). 
112 The statutes listed in note 104 supra are listed as exceptions in the present statute. 
113 State v. Home Brewing Co., 182 Ind. 75, 79-80, 105 N.E. 909, 911 (1914). 
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Orleans (1804-1812). The organic act of 1804,114 after provid-
ing for habeas corpus and trial by jury, declared that "the laws 
in force in the said territory" should continue until modified or 
repealed. This act was amended in 1805115 by adding that the in-
habitants of the Territory should be "entitled to and enjoy all 
the rights, privileges, and advantages secured by the said ordi-
nance [of 1787], and now enjoyed by the people of Mississippi 
territory." That the latter provision had the effect of making 
English common law the rule of decision was strongly argued, 
but not sustained.116 Following the precedent of the Quebec Act,111 
the territorial legislature in 1805 made the English common law 
the rule of decision for criminal cases,118 and declared that other 
cases were to be determined by reference to: 
"I. The roman Civil code, as being the foundation of 
the spanish law, by which this country was governed before 
its cession by France and to the United States, which is com-
posed of the institutes, digest and code of the emperor Justin-
ian, aided by the authority of the commentators of the civil 
law, and particularly of Domat in his treaty of the Civils 
laws; the whole so far as it has not been derogated from by 
the spanish law; 
"2. The Spanish law, consisting of the books of the re-
copilation de Castilla and autos acordados being nine books 
in the whole; the seven parts or partidas of the king Don 
Alphonse the learned, and the eight books of the royal statute 
(fueroreal) of Castilla; the recopilation de indias, save what 
is therein relative to the enfranchisement of Slaves, the laws 
de Toro, and finally the ordinances and royal orders and 
decrees, which have been formally applied to the colony of 
Louisiana, but not otherwise; the whole aided by the author-
ity of the reputable commentators admitted in the course of 
Justice .... 
"[T]hat in matters of commerce the ordinance of Bilbao 
is that which has full authority in this Territory, to decide 
all contestations relative thereto; and that wherever it is not 
sufficiently explicit, recourse may be had to the roman laws; 
to Beawes lex mercatoria, to Park on insurance, to the treatise 
of the insurences by Emorigon, and finally to the commen-
114 Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 13, 2 Stat. 287. 
115 Act of March 2, 1805, ch. 23, § 1, 2 Stat. 322. 
116 See Blume, Territorial Courts and Law: I, 61 MrcH. L. REV. 39, 53 (1952). 
117 See text accompanying note 70 supra. 
118 Statute of May 4, 1805, § 33, an act of the legislature of the Territory of Orleans, 
quoted in State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. 545, 547 (La. 1844). 
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taries of Valin, and to the respectable authors consulted in 
the United States."119 
The quoted act was disapproved by Governor Claiborne May 26, 
1806. In a letter to the Secretary of State explaining his veto the 
Governor remarked: "The Judges of the Superior Court can deter-
mine the authorities on which to rely. Their selection would likely 
be more judicious than any which the legislature could make."120 
The legislature, however, did not see fit to leave the matter to the 
judiciary but proceeded to formulate and adopt a complete civil 
code.121 
In 1827, after Orleans had become the state of Louisiana, the 
Supreme Court found it necessary to decide a civil matter not 
covered by the Code.122 In the course of a long opinion Mr. Justice 
Porter referred to provisions of the Fuero Real (1255) and Parti-
das (1260) of Spain, and the views of leading commentators as 
to their meaning. He observed: 
"This jurisprudence, or common law, in some nations, 
is found in the decrees of their courts; in others, it is fur-
nished by private individuals, eminent for their learning 
and integdty, whose superior wisdom has enabled them to 
gain the proud distinction of legislating, for their country, 
and enforcing their legislation by the most noble of all 
means:-that of reason alone."123 
In 1844, after quoting the territorial statute of 1805 "which 
introduced the common law in all criminal matters," the state 
court held: 
i10 Set out in Franklin, The Place of Thomas Jefferson in the Expulsion of Spanish 
Medieval Law from Louisiana, 16 TuL. L. REV. 319, 323-26 (1942). See also Brown, 
Legal Systems in Conflict: Orleans Territory 1804-1812, l AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35, 47 (1957). 
120 3 MISSISSIPPI TERRITORIAL ARCHIVES, OFFICIAL LEITER BOOKS OF Gov. ,v. c. C. 
CLAIBORNE 1801-1816, at 309 (Rowland ed. 1917). 
121 See Brown, supra note 119, at 54-56. The act promulgating the Code of 1808 
stated: "Whereas, in the confused state in which civil laws of this territory were 
plunged, by the effect of the changes which happened in its government, it had become 
indispensable to make known the laws which have been preserved after the abrogation 
of those which were contrary to the Constitution of the United States, or irreconcileable 
with its principles, and to collect them in a single work, which might serve as a guide 
for the decision of the courts and juries, without recurring to a multiplicity of books, 
which, being for the most part written in foreign languages, offer in their interpretation 
inexhaustible sources of litigation." Id. at 54. Article IV, § 11, of the first state constitution 
of Louisiana (1812) provided: "The existing laws of this territory, when this con-
stitution goes into effect, shall continue to be in force until altered or abolished by the 
legislature; provided, however, that the legislature shall never adopt any system or 
code of laws, by a general reference to the said system or code, but in all cases, shall 
specify the several provisions of the laws it may enact." 
122 Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Martin (N.S.) 569 (La. 1827). 
123 Id. at 582. 
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"We concur with the counsel in believing that the Legis-
lature, in adopting the common law rules of proceeding, 
method of trial, &c., adopted the system as it existed in 1805, 
modified, explained and perfected by statutory enactments, 
so far as those enactments are not found to be inconsistent 
with the peculiar character and genius of our government 
and institutions."124 
English statutes altering the common law passed in 1548125 and 
1728-1729126 were considered a part of the common law referred 
to in the act of 1805 .. 
Louisiana (North of Orleans) (1804-1812). The organic acts 
of 1804127 and 1805128 continued in force the prior laws-the 
same laws as were in force in Orleans when that territory was 
organized. Under the act of 1804 Louisiana was a district to be 
administered by the Governor and judges of Indiana. In 1805 
the district became a territory with its own officers. The judges 
were given the same jurisdiction as the judges of Indiana, viz., 
the "common law jurisdiction" originally conferred by the North-
west Ordinance (1787). 
In the period before 1812, when the name of the territory 
was changed from Louisiana to Missouri, two statutes were passed 
which indicated an inclination to make common law the rule of 
decision, at least in matters of procedure: 
[1807] The rules of common law respecting evidence as 
adopted by the courts of the United States having common 
law jurisdiction shall govern the decisions of the courts of 
this territory in like cases.129 · 
[I 81 OJ In all cases where a remedy cannot be had in the 
ordinary course of the common law proceeding, the General 
Court shall exercise a chancery jurisdiction.130 
124 State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. 545, 547 (La. 1844). 
125 2 &: 3 Edw. 6, c. 24 (1548) (murder, where prosecuted). 
120 2 Geo. 2, c. 21 (1728-1729) (murder, where prosecuted). 
121 Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 11, 2 Stat. 286. 
128 Act of March 3, 1805, ch. 31, § 9, 2 Stat. 332. 
120 I MISSOURI TERRITORIAL LAws 105, 124 (1842). 
130 Id. at 239-40. In a letter dated Dec. 17, 1807, Frederick Bates, Secretary and 
sometimes acting governor of Louisiana Territory, stated: "The codes of Governors 
Harrison &: Wilkinson were hastily digested and during the last summer, I cooperated 
with the Judges in giving them a thorough revision; and in forming a system which 
has almost entirely superced[ed] the old one." I THE LIFE AND PAPERS OF FREDERICK 
BATES 246 (Marshall ed. 1926). After describing the situation of "the Spanish and 
French inhabitants," he observed: "The summary decree of a military officer however 
tyrannical or absurd is much better suited to their ideas of the fitness of things, than 
the dilatory trial by jury and 'the glorious uncertainty of the Common Law.' " Id. at 
242-43. While a judge of Michigan Territory, Bates referred to the common law as 
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The congressional act of 1805 had provided jury trial for all 
criminal prosecutions and for all civil cases of the value of 100 
dollars. Developments after 1812 will be found under Missouri, 
infra. 
Michigan (1805-1836). The act creating Michigan Territory 
out of Indiana (1805)131 incorporated by reference the provisions 
of the Northwest Ordinance (1787) conferring "common law 
jurisdiction" and guaranteeing judicial proceedings "according 
to the course of the common law." It was at first assumed that the 
laws of the prior territory had not continued in force, but the 
contrary was held by the Supreme Court in 1806.132 Among the 
prior laws was the Northwest statute of 1795 (Virginia Ordinance 
of 1776) making the English law of 1607 the "rule of decision." 
Though the provision of the Northwest Ordinance which saved 
to certain "French and Canadian" inhabitants "their laws and 
customs" relative to descent and conveyance of property did not 
in terms apply to the French inhabitants of the Detroit area, Jay's 
Treaty (1794; 1796) had provided that all settlers and traders in 
the area should "continue to enjoy, unmolested, all their property 
of every kind." Determination of these rights required reference 
to the law in force prior to surrender by the British (1796),133 
viz., the law declared in force by the Quebec Act of 1774.134 
In 1808 Judge Woodward proposed re-enactment of all prior 
laws deemed suitable, after which all prior laws not re-enacted 
"ought to cease to have operation."135 This proposal led to a re-
enactment in 1809136 which was declared invalid by the Supreme 
an "admired system •.. the wisdom of which is attested by the consequentive approba-
tion of the ages." Id. at 85-86. In April 1808 he ordered from Baltimore the following: 
"Dallas Reports-Washington's Reports-Burrow's Reports-Gilberts Law of Evidence 
-Impey's Practice. Lilly's Entries. Boccaria on crimes &: punishments." Id. at 336. In 
Michigan he participated in the adoption of the laws which constituted Michigan's 
first code, usually referred to as the "Woodward Code" of 1806. In his opinion, these 
laws plus the common law constituted "a code sufficiently ample for governments so 
temporary and fleeting as those established by the Ordinance of 1787." Id. at 86. 
131 Act of 1805 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 5, § 2, 2 Stat. 309. 
132 See United States v. Muir (1806), reported in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at 58 (Blume ed. 1935). See also id. 
at xxxvi-xxxvii. 
133 Opinion by Woodward, C.J., recorded in the court's journal, printed in l 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at 
385-95 (Blume ed. 1935). 
134 See text accompanying note 71 supra. 
135 12 MICHIGAN PIONEER COLLECTIONS 465 (1907). 
130 Forty-four laws known as the "'Witherell Code." 4 LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF 
MICHIGAN 21-91 (reprint 1884). 
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Court, and repealed in 1810.137 The legislature then adopted from 
Virginia a law declaring: 
"That no act of the parliament of England, and no act 
of the parliament of Great Britain, shall have any force 
within the territory of Michigan .... 
"That the Coutume de Paris, or ancient French common 
law, existing in this country, the laws, acts, ordinances, ar-
rests and decrees of the governors or other authorities of the 
province of Canada, and the province of Louisiana, under the 
ancient French crown, and of the governors, parliaments or 
other authorities of the province of Canada generally, and of 
the province of Upper Canada particularly, under the British 
Crown, are hereby formally annulled, and the same shall be 
of no force within the territory of Michigan . . . . 
"That the laws adopted and made by the governor and 
judges of the territory of the United States north-west of the 
river Ohio, and the laws made by the general assembly of the 
said territory, and the laws adopted and made by the governor 
and judges of the territory of Indiana, shall be of no force 
within the territory of Michigan .... "138 
In Virginia the Ordinance of 1776 making English law of 1607 
the rule of decision was not repealed until the revisals initiated 
by Jefferson were completed in 1792. In Michigan the statute 
based on the Virginia Ordinance was repealed before the pro-
posed revision was completed-in fact, before it was fairly begun. 
When the revision was completed in 1821 (Code of 1820), the 
repealing act of 1810 was republished. 
In 1818 the territorial supreme court refused to apply a Brit-
ish statute passed in 1677,130 holding that it must be guided by 
the ancient common law, Judge Woodward stating: 
"That system of regulations and enactments, which bears 
the grand, and widely circulated, appellation of 'THE COM-
MON LA w,' receives its date from the third day of September, 
in the year 1189. 
"On that day, being the epoch of the coronation of 
RICHARD Coeur de Lion; and the first monarch of the name 
of RICHARD on the English throne; the 'COMMON LAw' be-
came complete, and insusceptible of any additions. 
137 Id. at 92. 
138 I u..ws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 900 (reprint 1871). 
1311 29 Car. 2, c. 7 (1677) (prohibiting execution of civil process on Sunday). 
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"The Common Law is composed of the unwritten, and 
of the written, law of England, anterior to that rera."140 
In 1828141 the court refused to apply an English statute passed 
in 1330,142 Woodbridge, C.J., noting: 
"The whole body of the Com law-so far as it consists 
with our peculiar Govt & with our own Stat. Law & and with 
the altered condition of society, I have always considered as 
in full force here. . . . 
"But by the revolution, the Com. Law was lopped off .... 
"The Stat. of 4th Ed. 3 [1330] is introductive of new law 
& does not I apprehend possess any force here."143 
In a well-written dissenting opinion Sibley, J ., stated: 
"The rigid principles of the Common law, have been 
gradually relaxing and becoming obsolete in England as 
the condition of the society has changed-The decisions 
of the Courts in that Country, have done much in aid of 
Legislation to bring about such a change in the Common 
Law, as to render it almost a new Code of Laws when com-
pared with, what it was in practice, under the Saxon and 
Norman dynasties .... 
"A question arises, and which it is necessary to meet at 
this time-which is-Is the Com Law of England in force 
in the Territory of Michigan? If so at what point of time 
was it adopted?-! think there can be no question or doubt 
but that the common law, at least so much thereof as is 
applicable to the state of our society, is in force, and that it 
was given us by the ordinance of 1787. The date of that 
ordinance, in my opinion is the point of time at which we 
must enquire, what was the common law, and such as we find 
it was on that day, it is in force in the Ter" unless altered 
since by positive enactments or statute Laws of the Terri-
tory.''144 
140 Grant v. Thomas, Earl of Selkirk (1818), reported in 1 TRANsAcrioNS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1814-1824, at 431, 436 (Blume ed. 1938). 
Cf. GooDENOW, op. cit. supra note 88, at 63: "We next enter the reign of Richard I. 
who entered upon his royal career, A.D. 1189. Here we quit the 'vantage ground' of the 
common law: as we have it here, so it is to be taken by all who receive it naked as a 
law; for that part of the law of England which consists in general customs and usage--
as to estates, jurisdiction of courts, prerogatives of the king and parliament, all civil 
powers, crimes and punishments, here ceases to increase its stock or extend its field 
of operation." 
141 Chene v. Campau (1828), reported in 1 TRANSAGrlONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1825-1836, at 305 (Blume ed. 1940). 
142 4 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1330) (executor's action for trespass). 
143 Chene v. Campau, supra note 141, at 308·09. 
144 Id. at 310-11. 
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Sibley was willing to assume that the common law guaranteed 
by the Northwest Ordinance was the common law of I 776, but 
was unwilling to concur in the view that it was common law un-
affected by English statutes. Rather, it was common law "in a 
modified and improved state" that was in force. In 1886, after 
pointing out that the repealing act of 1810 left "no statute or 
code law in force except that of Michigan and of the United 
States," Campbell, C.J., of the state supreme court observed: 
"Michigan was never a common-law colony, and while we have 
recognized the common law as adopted into our jurisprudence, 
it is the English common law, unaffected by statute."145 
Illinois (1809-1818). The act146 which created Illinois Terri-
tory out of Indiana (1809) incorporated by reference the "com-
mon law" provisions of the Northwest Ordinance, but did not 
continue in force the statutes of the prior territory. In 1812147 
the territorial legislature declared in force all unrepealed Indiana 
statutes of general nature in force in 1809. Included was the In-
diana statute of 1807 which had made, with specified exceptions,148 
the English law of 1607 the rule of decision. Referring to this 
statute as re-enacted and modified after Illinois became a state, 
the supreme court observed in 1852: "Our statute adopts not 
only the common law of England, but all statutes in aid thereof, 
passed prior to 4 James I, (except ... ) which are of a general 
nature and not local to that kingdom."149 
Missouri (1812-1821 ). Louisiana (north of Orleans) became 
Missouri Territory in 1812.150 The organic act provided that the 
people of the territory should always be entitled to judicial pro-
ceedings "according to the common law and the laws and usages 
in force in the said territory." In 1816 the territorial legislature 
passed a statute, similar to the Virginia Ordinance of 1776, 
making English law of 1607 the rule of decision, but with this 
proviso: 
"[T]hat none of the British statutes respecting crimes and 
punishments shall be in force in this territory, nor shall any 
U5 In the Matter of Lamphere, 61 Mich. 105, 108, 27 N.W. 882, 883 (1886). 
U6 Act of 1809 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 13, § 2, 2 Stat. 515. 
147 PoPE's DIGEST 34 (Philbrick ed. 1938). 
us See text accompanying note 112 supra. The statutory exceptions were the same 
as those listed in note 104 supra. 
149 Plumleigh v. Cook, 13 Ill. 669, 671 (1852). The court stated: "But the statutes 
of Westminster 2, ch. 11, 13 Edward 1, and l Richard 2 c. 12, gave an additional remedy 
[for an escape] by action of debt. And those statutes, being in aid of the common law, 
are in full force in this State." Id. at 671. 
150 Missouri Organic Act of 1812, ch. 95, § 14, 2 Stat. 747. 
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person be punished by common law, where the laws and 
statutes of this territory have made provision on the subject, 
but where_the laws and statutes of the United States and this 
territory have not made provision for the punishment of 
offences, the several courts may proceed to punish for such 
offences .... "151 
This statute was one of the laws continued in force by the Mis-
souri state constitution of 1820,152 and, as later modified, is still 
in force. The legislative acts of Missouri, including the act of 
1816, were adopted in Florida in 1822.153 A full discussion of the 
Spanish law in force prior to 1807 is contained in Cutler v. Wad-
dingham, 22 Mo. 206 (1855). In 1883 the state supreme court 
held that the English statute of 1330,154 held inapplicable to 
Michigan in 1828,155 was in force in Missouri as a part of the com-
mon law.156 
Alabama (1817-1819). The act157 -creating Alabama Territory 
out of Mississippi provided that all laws in force in the territory 
should continue. Included was the Mississippi statute of 1807 
which had declared that "all statutes of England and Great-Brit-
ain" not contained in the volume of statutes should cease to 
have force in the territory.158 Also included was the Mississippi 
act of 1802, amended in 1807, which had provided that "every 
other felony, misdemeanor or offence whatsoever not provided 
for by this act, shall be punished as heretofore by the common 
law."159 These laws were continued in force by the state constitu-
tion of 1819.160 In 1851 the state supreme court found it unneces-
sary to inquire whether a statute of 43 Elizabeth161 was in force, 
saymg: 
151 1 MISSOURI TERRITORIAL LAws 436 (1842). 
152 Mo. CONST., § 2 of the Schedule (1820). 
153 See statements by Judge Brackenridge, in text at notes 173 and 174 infra. 
154 4 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1330) (executor's action for trespass). 
1515 Chene v. Campau (1828), reported in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME CoURT 
OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1825-1836, at 305 (Blume ed. 1940). 
156 Baker's Adm'r v. Crandall, 78 Mo. 584 (1883). Also held in force was 31 Edw. 
3, St. 1, c. 11 (1357) (administration on intestacy). In 1855 a judge of the supreme court 
stated: "After the introduction of the common law, the Spanish law no longer had any 
existence here. It has only been regarded in the interpretation of contracts which had 
been made before its abrogation and on the adjustment of rights which had accrued 
prior to the introduction of the common law, just as we would look at this day to the 
laws of Spain, in interpreting a contract which had been made in that kingdom." 
Reaume v. Chambers, 22 Mo. 36, 53 (1855). 
157 Alabama Organic Act of 1817, ch. 59, § 2, 3 Stat. 372. 
158 STATUTES OF MISSISSIPPI TERRITORY 19 (Toulmin ed. 1807). 
159 Id. at 324. 
160 ALA. CoNST., § 5 of the Schedule (1819). 
161 Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4. 
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"It appears that that statute was passed in the year 1601, 
and the first settlement of Virginia, (that being the first settle-
ment in any part of the United States,) was in 1607. And the 
doctrine appears to be settled that English statutes passed be-
fore the emigration of our ancestors to America, and which 
were applicable to our situation and not inconsistent with 
our institutions and government, constitute a part of the 
common law, and are in force (unless repealed) in all the 
States of the Union."162 
Arllansas (1819-1836). When Arkansas Territory was created 
out of Missouri in 1819,163 all laws in force on July 4 were con-
tinued in force. Referring to the Missouri act of 1816164 which, 
following the Virginia Ordinance of 1776, had made English law 
of 1607 the rule of decision, a judge of the state supreme court 
observed in 1884: 
"This statute remained to govern the subsequently formed 
territory of Arkansas, and was aftenvards re-enacted as a 
part of the laws of the State, with some change of phraseology 
and grammatical arrangements."165 
The statute of 43 Elizabeth (1601),166 held to be in force in 
Alabama without the aid of a statute similar to the Virginia 
Ordinance of I 776,167 was declared in force in Arkansas in 1905 
under the Missouri act of 1816 as re-enacted in Arkansas after 
statehood.168 
Florida (1822-1845). The organic act of 1822169 continued 
the laws then in force, viz., the laws of Spain as modified by an 
ordinance promulgated by General Jackson in 1821 providing 
that judicial proceedings in criminal cases should be conducted 
"according to the course of the common law."170 In the Fall of 
1822 the territorial legislature repealed the prior laws, declaring 
that English law of 1607 "together with the system of equity rec-
162 Carter &: Wife v. Balfour's Adm'r, 19 Ala. 814, 829 (1851) (emphasis added); 
cited with approval in Nelson v. McCrary, 60 Ala. 301 (1877), involving 13 Edw. I, c. 18 
(1285) (alternative methods of execution). 
163 Arkansas Organic Act of 1819, ch. 49, § IO, 3 Stat. 495. 
164 I MISSOURI T.EIUU'roRIAL LAws 436 (1842). See text at note 151 supra. 
165 Horsley v. Hilburn, 44 Ark. 458, 473 (1884). 
166 Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. I, c. 4. 
167 See text accompanying note 162 supra. 
168 Biscoe v. Thweatt, 74 Ark. 545, 86 S.W. 432 (1905). 
169 Florida Organic Act of 1822, ch. 13, §§ 9, 13, 3 Stat. 657, 659. 
170 ANNALS OF CONG., 17th Cong., 1st Sess. 2551-53 (1855). See also THOMAS, A HISTORY 
OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN NEWLY ACQUIRED T.EIUU'rORY OF THE UNITED STATES 54-97 
(1904). 
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ognized and practiced in the U. States," should be the rule of 
decision.171 This statute was word for word the Missouri statute 
of 1816,172 with the quoted reference to equity added. In 1831 
Judge Brackenridge stated: 
"The first acts of the Legislative Council were passed in 
the summer of 1822, one year after the acquisition of the 
Territory .... Foreseeing, however, the difficulty under 
which the Territory would labor for the want of a suitable 
code of laws, I had procured a volume of the digested Leg-
islative acts of Missouri, which had been similarly situated, 
having been also a province of Spain. . . . Our first Council, 
received this volume as their text book, and adopted the 
greater part of it, with little or no alteration."173 
The following is his explanation of why the laws of Missouri 
instead of those of Louisiana were copied: 
"The Territory of Orleans, now the State of Louisiana, 
continued to be governed in civil matters by Spanish laws; 
the greater part of its inhabitants, having been accustomed 
to them, and estates being held subject to its rules. Missouri, 
on the contrary, was settled by citizens of the United States, 
habituated to English and American legislation. The volume 
to which I have alluded, was the result of fifteen years ex-
perience in that State, and yet contained for the greater part, 
little more than the adaptation of the joint labours of J effer-
son, Wythe and Madison, and of some of the Pennsylvania 
Legislators, to the circumstances of the country."174 
For some reason unknown to Judge Brackenridge all the 1822 
statutes were repealed in 1823. At this time the legislature de-
clared in force the common and statute law of England down to 
July 4, 1776, except British statutes respecting crimes and mis-
demeanors.175 This act was revised in 1829,176 but retained the 
cut-off date of July 4, I 776. "By the act adopting the Common 
Law of England" it appeared to Judge Brackenridge "that none 
of the British statutes, on the subject of crimes and misdemeanors" 
were in force in the territory in 1831 except such as were "declar-
171 Acrs OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA 1822, at 53 (1823). 
172 1 MISSOURI TERRITORIAL LA.ws 436 (1842). See text at note 151 supra. 
173 Presentments of the Grand Jury of Jackson County, Dec. 1831, 24 TERRITORIAL 
PAPERS 609, 613. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Acrs OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA lll (1823). 
176 Id. at 8 (1829). 
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atory, and in aid of the Common Law."177 In 1845 the governor 
of the state of Florida was "authorized to appoint some suitable 
person, to collect and arrange, under appropriate heads, all the 
Statutes of Great Britain, in force in this state."178 This was in-
tended to clear up the uncertainty which had existed throughout 
the territorial period as to precisely what statutes of England were 
in force. The appointment was made, and the list compiled but 
not officially approved and not published until almost a century 
later.110 
Wisconsin (1836-1848). The act180 creating Wisconsin Terri-
tory out of Michigan (1836) incorporated by reference the provi-
sion of the Northwest Ordinance (1787) that guaranteed "judicial 
proceedings according to the course of the common law." The 
organic act further provided that "the existing laws of the Terri-
tory of Michigan" should be extended over Wisconsin until al-
tered or repealed.181 Among the laws extended was the Michigan 
act of 1810182 declaring that no English or British statute should 
have force within the territory. In 1839 the Wisconsin legisla-
ture repealed all Michigan acts in force in Wisconsin on July 4, 
1836, at the same time providing that "none of the statutes of 
Great Britain" should be considered as law of the territory.183 
The state constitution (1848) provided: 
"Such parts of the common law as are now in force in 
the territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this consti-
tution, shall be and continue part of the law of this state until 
altered or suspended by the legislature."184 
In 1864 the state supreme court found it reasonable to hold that 
"when our territorial legislature and the framers of our con-
stitution recognized the existence here of the common law, 
they must be held to have had reference to that law as it ex-
isted, modified and amended by English statutes passed prior 
to the revolution. As before shown, there was no one time 
177 24 T.ERRITORIAL PAPERS 609, 615. See also Day, Extent to Which the English 
Common Law and Statutes Are in Effect, 3 U. FLA. L. R.Ev. 303 (1950); Note, 3 U. FLA. 
L. R.Ev. 74 (1950), 
178 Ac::rs OF FLORIDA ll8 (1845). 
179 3 FLA. STAT. 1941, at 3 (published in 1946 under the heading HELPFUL AND USEFUL 
MATIER). 
180 Wisconsin Organic Act of 1836, ch. 54, § 12, 5 Stat. 15. 
181 Ibid. 
182 1 LAws OF THE T.ERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 900 (reprint 1871). 
183 STATUTES OF THE T.ERRITORY OF WISCONSIN 1838-1839, at 404, 407 (1839). 
1s, WIS. CONST. art. 13, § 13 (1848). 
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applicable to all the colonies, and there is no reason to assume 
that we should adopt the commencement of one colony rather 
than another as the time applicable to us. The revolution 
itself is the dividing line which the reasoning of these cases 
would suggest for us."185 
In 1872186 the court found that an English statute enacted in 
1707187 was in force in Wisconsin as a part of the common law, 
but that a statute enacted in England in 1774188 was not in force. 
The court had "every reason to think" that the act of 1707 had 
been "looked upon as a part of the laws of the colonies before the 
revolution," but that the statute of 1774 was enacted 
"on the very eve of the revolution, and at a time when we 
know our ancestors, in their colonial state, could not have 
become familiar with, or have ratified or adopted it, and at 
a time, too, when, as history shows, all or nearly all respect 
for British sovereignty and British laws or acts of parliament 
then being passed, was well nigh extinct throughout the 
colonies. "189 
In 1956 this statement was made: 
"The common law in effect at the time of the adoption of 
our state constitution is difficult of definition. We do not 
think it is confined to English statutes and the decisions of 
English courts .... [T]he term 'common law' is broad 
enough to embrace customs and usages and legal maxims 
and principles in vogue at that time."190 
Iowa (1838-1846). The act191 creating Iowa out of Wisconsin 
(1838) declared that the inhabitants of the new territory should 
be entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities thereto-
fore granted to Wisconsin, and that the "existing laws" of Wis-
consin should be continued until modified or repealed. These 
provisions extended to Iowa the article of the Northwest Ordi-
nance (1787) guaranteeing "judicial proceedings according to the 
course of the common law," and the Michigan statute of 1810192 
declaring that no English or British statute should be in force. In 
185 Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 156, 162 (1864). 
186 Spaulding v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 30 Wis. 110 (1872). 
187 6 Anne, c. 31, § 6 (1706-1707) (loss by fire). 
188 14 Geo. 3, c. 78, § 86 (1774) (loss by fire). 
189 Spaulding v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 30 Wis. 110, 117-18 (1872). 
190 Menne v. City of Fond du Lac, 273 Wis. 341, 345, 77 N.W.2d 703, 705 (1956). 
191 Iowa Organic Act of 1838, ch. 96, § 12, 5 Stat. 239. 
192 1 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 900 (reprint 1871). 
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1840 the territorial legislature repealed all the laws of Michigan 
and Wisconsin, and, like Wisconsin, declared that "none of the 
statutes of Great Britain shall be considered as law of this terri-
tory."193 In a case before the state supreme court in 1857 it 
was argued: 
"The territory of Iowa was a part of the territory of 
Louisiana. It had always, up to the time of its purchase by 
the United States, been subject to the civil law, and the com-
mon law of England never was in force in any part of said 
territory. The common law was not extended over this ter-
ritory by the purchase, or by the treaty entered into in con-
nection with the purchase. The common law has never been 
in force in any part of the United States, except it was carried 
there while subject to Great Britain, or was carried there and 
established by positive statutory enactment."194 
In response Judge Woodward stated: 
"In the first place, according to our recollection of history, 
the common law was substituted for the civil by the Missouri 
territory, of which this state was once a part. In the next 
place, so many rights and titles-so great interests have grown 
up, as if by and under the common law, and not by and under 
the civil-that it would be the duty of a court to hold that 
the people brought it with them. . . . 
"But the ordinance of 1787, for the government of the 
Northwest Territory, made it the law of that country; and 
that was extended over Wisconsin, and then the laws of Wis-
consin, over Iowa. And although the statutes of Michigan 
and Wisconsin were repealed in 1840, the ordinance of 1787 
was not affected, but remained in full vigor as before."195 
The transaction involved in the case had occurred in October 
1840 after enactment of the statute which declared that "none 
of the statutes of Great Britain" should be considered law. Did 
this statute preclude application of an English statute196 passed 
in 1236? Judge Woodward's answer: 
"Then the question is, whether the declaration of that 
section extended to the statutes of England. Great Britain 
is not the same with England, although it includes it. The 
greater part, if not all those beneficial acts, which have been 
193 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF IowA 20 (1840). 
194 O'Ferrall v. Simplot, 4 Iowa 381, 384 (1857) (argument for appellant). 
195 Id. at 399-400. 
198 Statute of Merton, 1235-1236, 20 Hen. 3, c. 1 (damages on writ of dower). 
498 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
adopted into the laws of the American States, were enacted 
before the Union with Scotland. The periods at which the 
English statutes have been held to cease operating upon 
American law, have been different in different states. 
"Some have stopped at the fourth of James I [1607], 
which was about the period of the first emigration to this 
country; some have fixed the epoch of our revolution; and 
some, if we mistake not, that of the revolution of 1688. The 
above act of 1840 may reasonably be considered as having 
prescribed the event of the union of the crown of England 
with that of Scotland, which was nearly contemporaneous 
with that of the English revolution, it having taken place in 
the year 1707. This is more reasonable than to regard that 
declaration as to the statutes of Great Britain, as synonymous 
with a like declaration in relation to the statutes of England, 
which would receive support from neither history, language, 
nor the principles of interpretation. We conclude, therefore, 
that the statute of Merton is not deprived of any effect by 
the foregoing declaration of the act of 1840."197 
In 1902198 the court referred to an English statute passed in 
169!199 as being "a part of the common law of this country," citing 
the case quoted from above.200 
Oregon (1848-1859). The act201 organizing Oregon as a terri-
tory (1848) incorporated by reference the article of the Northwest 
Ordinance (1787) which guaranteed "judicial proceedings accord-
ing to the course of the common law." The act further provided 
that "the existing laws now in force in the territory of Oregon, 
under the authority of the provisional government established by 
the people thereof" shall continue until modified or repealed. 
The provisional government referred to was established by the 
inhabitants of the area without prior authority from Congress.202 
In 1841 a judge with probate powers was appointed, and a reso-
lution adopted directing him to act "according to the laws of the 
state of New York" until "a code of laws be adopted by this 
community."203 It was later questioned by a person then present 
197 O'Ferrall v. Simplot, 4 Iowa 381, 384 (1857). 
198 McClure v. Dee, 115 Iowa 546, 549, 88 N.W. 1093, 1093-94 (1902). 
199 3 W. &: M., c. 14 (1691) (fraudulent devises). 
200 In Gardner v. Cole, 21 Iowa 205, 210 (1866), statutes of 13 Eliz. 1, c. 5 (1571) 
and 27 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (1584-1585) relating to fraudulent conveyances, were held to be in 
force as "part of the unwritten law." 
201 Oregon Organic Act of 1848, ch. 177, § 14, 9 Stat. 329. 
202 For details, see Beardsley, Code Making in Early Oregon, 27 PACIFIC NORTHWEST 
Q. 1 (1936). 
203 Warner, History of the Oregon Code, 1 ORE. L. REv. 129, 132 (1922), 
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"whether there was a single copy of the laws of that state [New 
York] in the country for ten years after the last resolution was 
passed. I know there was none at the time [February 18, 1841], 
and only a single copy of the laws of Iowa two years after."204 
In I 843 a legislative committee recommended that specified 
laws passed at the first session of the Iowa legislature (1838-39) 
be adopted as laws of Oregon,205 and that "the laws of Iowa terri-
tory shall be the law of this territory, in civil, military, and crim-
inal cases; where not otherwise provided for, and where no statute 
of Iowa territory applies, the principles of common law and equity 
shall govern."206 
The House Journal for the August I 845 session shows that 
"the bill adopting Iowa statutes, was read a third time, and 
passed"; also, that "the bill to amend [specified] Iowa statutes ... 
was read a third time, and passed."207 
The Constitution of the state, of Oregon (1859) provided: "All 
laws in force in the territory of Oregon when this Constitution 
takes effect, and consistent therewith, shall continue in force until 
altered or repealed. "208 
In I 9 I 9 the state supreme court found it necessary to decide 
whether an English statute passed in 1738209 was a part of Oregon 
common law; after quoting the above constitutional provision, 
Bean, J., stated: 
"In applying the general rule to a state which, like ours, 
had no political existence before the Revolution, it must in 
harmony with reason be held that when our territorial legis-
lature and the framers of our Constitution and our courts 
recognized the existence here of the common law, they must 
have had reference to that law as it existed, modified and 
amended by the English statutes passed prior to the Revolu-
tion."210 
Minnesota (1849-1858). The Minnesota organic act (1849)211 
provided that "the laws in force in the Territory of Wisconsin" 
at the time of that territory's admission as a state (1848) should 
continue in force. Included was the Wisconsin act of 1839 which 
204 Id. at 132-33. 
205 Id. at 135. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Oregon House Journal, Aug. Session (1845). See Warner, supra note 203, at 140. 
208 OIU:. CONST. art. XVIII, § 7 (1859). 
!!Oil 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, § 15 (1737-1738) (distress for rent). 
210 Peery v. Fletcher, 93 Ore. 43, 53, 182 Pac. 143, 147 (1919). 
211 Minnesota Organic Act of 1849, ch. 121, § 12, 9 Stat. 407. 
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had declared that "none of the statutes of Great Britain" should 
be considered law.212 In 1877, after the state constitution (1857) 
had declared that "all laws now in force in the territory of Min-
nesota" should remain in force,213 the state supreme court held: 
"With reference to that statute 2 Wm. & Mary, c. 5, which 
gave the right to sell a distress (in that respect changing the 
common law,) we agree with the supreme court of Wisconsin 
in Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147. It is there held, upon 
grounds to which we see no objection, that the common law 
of a state which had no political existence before the revolu-
tion, is the common law as modified and amended by English 
statutes passed prior to our revolution. . . . As the statute 
of William & Mary was passed long before the revolution, it 
was held to be part of the common law of distress in Wis-
consin, and, for the same reason, it is to be held to be part 
of the common law of Minnesota."214 
New Mexico (1850-1912). When New Mexico was occupied 
in the course of the Mexican War (1846) General Kearny under-
took to establish a territorial government.215 His organic act, usu-
ally referred to as the "Kearny Code," began: 
"'The government of the United States of America or-
dains and establishes the following organic law for the Terri-
tory of New Mexico, which has become a Territory of the 
said government.' Then followed a transcript of the Organic 
Law provided by Congress for the Missouri Territory. After 
this came forty pages of laws for the government of the terri-
tory. These were compiled by Colonel A. W. Doniphan and 
a private, Mr. W. P. Hall, who received notice of his election 
to Congress from Missouri while engaged on the work. The 
compilation was made from the laws of Mexico, modified to 
conform to the Constitution of the United States, and from 
the laws of Missouri, Texas, and Coahuila, the statutes of 
Missouri, and the rest from the Livingston Code [ of Louis-
iana] ."216 
After a territorial government had been established by Congress 
(1850)217 the territorial legislature in 1851 provided that all laws 
212 See note 183 supra. 
213 MINN. CONST. art. 16, § 2 of the Schedule (1857). 
214 Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn. 584, 591 (1877). 
215 For details, see THOMAS, op. cit. supra note 170, at 101-58. 
216 Id. at 105. Text of the "Kearny Code" in English and Spanish will be found in 
NEW MEXICO LAWS OF 1851 (1852). 
217 New Mexico Organic Act of 1850, ch. 49, 9 Stat. 446. 
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previously in force in the territory should continue "excepting 
in Kearny's Code the law concerning registers of land."218 At 
the same time the legislature provided that "in criminal cases, 
the common law as recognised in the United States and the several 
States of the Union" should be the rule of practice and decision.219 
In 1876 it was provided that in all courts of the Territory "the 
common law as recognized in the United States of America" should 
be the rule of practice and decision.220 The organic act (1850) 
had provided that the supreme and district courts should "possess 
chancery as well as common law jurisdiction." 
"Did this section of the organic act bring into this terri-
tory the common law in the broadest sense, or did it simply 
establish a system of procedure according to the course of the 
common law? ... Strange as it may appear, this question has 
never been decided by this court."221 
Referring to the statute of 1876 the court, speaking in 1886, said: 
"This territory ... was not a part of the original colonies, 
but was acquired in 1848. The legislature has not in terms 
adopted any British statutes, nor has it undertaken to define 
what is embraced in the words 'common law,' used in [1876]. 
"We are, therefore, of opinion that the legislature in-
tended by the language used in that section to adopt the 
common law, or lex non scripta, and such British statutes 
of a general nature not local to that kingdom, nor in conflict 
with the constitution or laws of the United States, nor of this 
territory, which are applicable to our condition and circum-
stances, and which were in force at the time of our separa-
tion from the mother country. The statute of limitations 
(21 Jae.I.) falls within this category, and became the law of 
limitations here in 1876, abrogating the Mexican law of 
prescription. "222 
Quoting some of the above language in 1887223 the court held 
that an English statute passed in I 710224 was part of New Mexico's 
common law. 
218 NEW MEXICO LAws OF 1851, at 176 (1852). 
210 Id. at 144. For meaning of "recognized," see Ex parte DeVore, 18 N.M. 246, 136 
Pac. 47 (1913). 
220 NEW MEXICO GENERAL LAws 122 (Prince ed. 1880). 
221 Brinker, J., in Browning v. Estate of Browning, 3 N.M. (3 Gild., E.W.S. ed.) 659, 
666, 9 Pac. 677, 679 (1886). 
222 Id. at 674-75, 9 Pac. at 684. 
223 Territory v. Ashenfelter, 4 N.M. (4 Gild., E.W.S. ed.) 93, 12 Pac. 879 (1887). 
224 9 Anne, c. 20 (1710) (quo warranto) (c. 25, Stat. Realm). 
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Utah (1850-1896). The Utah organic act (1850) provided that 
the supreme and district courts should "possess chancery as well 
as common law jurisdiction."225 In 1851 the first legislature of 
the territory 
"Resolved ... That the laws heretofore passed by the 
provisional government of the state of Deseret ... are hereby 
declared to be legal, and in full force and virtue, and shall 
so remain until superseded by the action of the Legislative 
Assembly of the Territory of Utah."226 
By these laws the supreme court judges were given appellate juris-
diction "in all cases of Law and Equity,"227 but were not told 
what law should govern them in deciding cases. In 1873 the ter-
ritorial supreme court held that "common law" was in force,228 
but found it unnecessary to decide whether the English statute 
of frauds229 was in force as part of the common law. E,:nerson, J., 
stated: 
"Utah was embraced in that acquisition [from Mexico]. 
As in Florida, the pre-existing law was Spanish. So in Utah, 
it was Mexican, and in both cases the laws were derived 
mainly from the laws of Rome. In neither did the English 
Common Law, or the Statute of Frauds, prevail. Congress 
made no special change, and the Territorial Legislature, upon 
whom authority was conferred, have made no express enact-
ment upon the subject. 
"This Territory was first settled in 1847, and from that 
time up to the acquisition and treaty in 1848, the settlers 
were comparatively few in number. There were no settled 
laws, usages and customs among them."230 
After noting that the many settlers who came in after the change 
of sovereignty were from states and territories having different 
laws and institutions, Judge Emerson continued: 
"These diversities make it impossible to assume that any 
specific body of the Common Law was transplanted to the 
Territory by the fact of immigration. 
225 Utah Organic Act of 1850, ch. 51, § 9, 9 Stat. 455. 
226 Aces, REsoLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH 1851, at 205 
{1852). 
221 An Ordinance To Provide for the Organization of the Judiciary of the State of 
Deseret, passed Jan. 9, 1850, found in 8 UTAH HISTORICAL Q. 169 (1940). 
228 First Nat'l Bank v. Kinner, 1 Utah 100 (1873). 
229 Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3. 
230 First Nat'l Bank v. Kinner, 1 Utah 100, 106 (1873). 
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"But one course was open, and that was for the whole 
body of the people to agree, expressly or tacitly, upon a com-
mon measure. It was to be expected that the emigrants would 
not be contented with the loose and alien institutions of an 
outlying Mexican department, and they have not been. 
"They have tacitly agreed upon maxims and principles 
of the Common Law suited to their conditions and consistent 
with the Constitution and Laws of the United States, and 
they only wait recognition by the courts to become the Com-
mon Law of the Territory. When so recognized, they are 
laws as certainly as if expressly adopted by the law-making 
power."231 
The chief justice reserved his opinion "upon the question how 
far, or what parts of the Common Law of England should be 
recognized in this Territory."232 In a case before the Supreme 
Court of the United States in 1889, Mr. Justice Bradley stated: 
"It is true, no formal declaration has been made by Con-
gress or the territorial legislature as to what system of law 
shall prevail there. But it is apparent from the language of 
the organic act . . . that it was the intention of Congress that 
the system of common law and equity which generally pre-
vails in this country should be operative in the Territory of 
Utah, except as it might be altered by legislation .... We 
may, therefore, assume that the doctrine of charities is ap-
plicable to the Territory .... "233 
The following is from the syllabus of a state case decided in 1897: 
"While the statute of uses234 never became a part of the 
English common law, and has never been adopted by the leg-
islature of this state, the rule of law that vests a passive or 
naked trust in the person having the use is a part of the 
common law of this state."235 
In 1915, after the state legislature had declared (1898) that "the 
common law of England" not repugnant to federal and state laws 
should be "the rule of decision,"236 the Supreme Court reviewed 
the above decisions, concluding: 
231 Id. at 107. 
232 Ibid. (McKean, C. J., concurring in judgment of the court). 
233 Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. I, 62 (1889). 
234 Statute of Uses, 1535-1536, 27 Hen. 8, c. IO. 
2311 Henderson v. Adams, 15 Utah 30, 48 Pac. 398 (1897). 
236 UTAH REv. STAT. § 2488 (1898), 
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"[W]hile Congress, by extending over the Territory of Utah 
the Constitution and laws of the United States, put in force, 
in the language of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
'the system of common law and equity which generally pre-
vails in this country,' yet did not so extend or transplant the 
common law of England, with all its rigor and harshness, but 
only so much of it as was and had been generally recognized 
and enforced in this country, and as is and was suitable to 
our conditions."237 
Washington (1853-1889). The act creating Washington Ter-
ritory out of Oregon (1853)238 provided that the territorial judges 
should "possess chancery as well as common-law jurisdiction"; 
also, that existing laws should continue in force until amended 
or repealed.239 In 1856 the territorial legislature declared that 
"the common law, in all civil cases, except where otherwise pro-
vided by law, shall be in force."240 In 1863 "the common law of 
England" was made "the rule of decision."241 This statute was 
re-enacted in 1877, adding "so far as the same is applicable to 
the situation and circumstances of this Territory."242 A similar 
statute was enacted after Washington became a state.243 In 1892 
the state supreme court stated that it understood that English 
statutes of frauds were in force "by virtue of §1 of the Code."2H 
In 194!245 it was assumed that the "common law" of Washington 
included specified statutes of 4 Edward 3, 31 Edward 3, and 
3 & 4 William 4.246 Following a quote of the state statute, the 
court said in 1930: 
"Construing this statute, we have held that the term 
'common law,' as therein used, includes not only the un-
written law of England as it was administered by its courts, 
237 Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 127, 148 Pac. 1096, 1100 (1915). 
238 Washington Organic Act of 1853, ch. 90, § 9, 10 Stat. 175. 
239 For discussions of the "existing laws" in Oregon, see Beardsley, supra note 202. 
See alo Beardsley, Compiling the Territorial Codes of Washington, 28 PACIFIC NORTIIWEST 
Q. 3 (1937); Beardsley, The Codes and Code Makers of Washington, 1889-1937, 80 
PACIFIC N0RTIIWEST Q. 3 (1939); Warner, supra note 203. 
240 Acrs OF THE LEGISLATIVE AssEMBLY OF THE TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON 1 (1856). 
241 2 LAws OF WASHINGTON 3 (reprint 1896). 
242 3 id. at 677. 
2¼3 THE REvISED STATUTES AND CODES OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON § 4099 (1896). 
244 Wagner v. Law, 3 Wash. 500, 502, 28 Pac. 1109, 1110 (1892). The statutes referred 
to were, it seems, 13 Eliz. 1, c. 5 (1571) (fraudulent conveyances), and Statute of Frauds, 
1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3. See also Allen v. Kane, 79 Wash. 248, 140 Pac. 534 (1914). 
245 Boyd v. Sibold, 7 Wash. 2d 279, 109 P.2d 535 (1941). 
246 4 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1330) (executor's action for trespass); 31 Edw. 3, St. 1, c. 1 (1357) 
(administration on intestacy); 3 8: 4 Will. 4, c. 42, § 2 (1833) (civil procedure). 
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but also the general statutes of that commonwealth modifying 
and interpreting the unwritten laws which were enacted prior 
to and in force at the time of our Declaration of Independ-
ence."247 
Kansas (1854-1861). The Kansas organic act (1854)248 con-
ferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common law 
jurisdiction." In a message to the first territorial legislature Gov-
ernor Reeder stated: 
"It appears that the laws of the United States not inappli-
cable to our locality-the laws of the territory of Indiana 
made between the 26th of March, 1804, and the 3d of March, 
1805, enacted for the district of Louisiana-the laws of the 
territory of Louisiana-the laws of the territory of Missouri-
the common law, and the law of the province of Louisiana at 
the time of the cession, except so far as the latter have super-
seded the former, still remain in force in the territory of 
Kansas. As the common law to a considerable extent was 
adopted for the territory by congress as late as 1812, and by 
the Missouri legislature as late as 1816 . . . it has without 
doubt superseded and supplied [supplanted] a great amount 
of the law previously existing."249 
At the same session (1855) the legislature passed a statute, similar 
to the Virginia Ordinance of I 776, making English law of 1607 
"the rule of action and decision," except British statutes for the 
punishment of crimes and misdemeanors.250 This statute was re-
enacted by the territorial legislature in 1859,251 and by the state 
legislature in 1862.252 In 1868 the state legislature provided that 
"the common law as modified by constitutional and statutory law, 
judicial decisions, and the conditions and wants of the people" 
should remain in force.253 In 1872 Valentine, J., stated: 
"We get our common law from England. It was brought 
over by our ancestors at the earliest settlement of this coun-
try. It dates back to the fourth year of the reign of James I., 
or 1607, when the first English settlement was founded in this 
country at Jamestown, Virginia. The body of the laws of 
247 Garrett v. Byerly, 155 Wash. 351, 354, 284 Pac. 343, 344 (1930). 
248 Nebraska-Kansas Act of 1854, ch. 59, § 9, 10 Stat. 280. 
249 Quoted by Burch, J., in Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 220-21, 80 Pac. 571, 576 
(1905). 
250 Id. at 221, 80 Pac. at 577. 
2~1 GENERAL LAws OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 678 (1862). 
252 Ibid. 
2:i3 GENERAL STATUTES OF KANSAS 1127 (1868). 
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England as they then existed now constitute our common law. 
It is so fixed by statute in this state."254 
According to the syllabus of a case decided in 1865: "The statute 
of Wm. III, c.15,255 in aid of the common law, has not been 
adopted in this state."256 
Nebraska (1854-1867). The Nebraska organic act (1854)257 
conferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common 
law jurisdiction." In 1855 the territorial legislature provided 
that "so much of the common law of England as is applicable" 
should be law within the territory.258 This statute was re-enacted 
by the state legislature, and has continued in force.200 In 1903 
Roscoe Pound, C., asked: 
"What is the meaning of the term 'common law of Eng-
land,' as used in chapter 15a, Compiled Statutes? Does it 
mean the common law as it stood at the time of the Declaration 
of Independence, or as it stood when our statute was enacted, 
or are we to understand the common-law system, in its en-
tirety, including all judicial improvements and modifications 
in this country and in England, to the present time, so far 
as applicable to our conditions? ... The term 'common law 
of England,' as used in the statute, refers to that general sys-
tem of law which prevails in England, and in most of the 
United States by derivation from England, as distinguished 
from the Roman or Civil Law system, which was in force in 
this territory prior to the Louisiana purchase. Hence the 
statute does not require adherence to the decisions of the 
English common-law courts prior to the Revolution, in case 
this court considers subsequent decisions, either in England 
or America, better expositions of the general principles of 
that system."260 
In another opinion delivered in 1903261 the learned Commis-
sioner pointed out that "in the whole course of decision in Ne-
braska, from the territorial courts to the present," only three 
established common-law doctrines had been declared inapplica-
254 See Kansas Pac. Ry. v. Nichols, 9 Kan. 162, 173 (1872); citing statutes referred 
to in notes 251 and 253 supra. 
255 9 Will. 3, c. 15 (1697-1698) (arbitration). 
256 Stigers v. Stigers, 5 Kan. 397 (1865). 
257 Nebraska-Kansas Act of 1854, ch. 59, § 9, 10 Stat. 280. 
258 NEBRASKA LAws 328 (1955). 
259 NEB. REv. STAT. § 49-101 (1943). 
260 Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 470-71, 94 N.W. 705, 708 (1903). 
261 Meng v. Coffee, 67 Neb. 500, 507, 93 N.W. 713, 715 (1903). 
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ble.262 Recent rejections of the English statute of uses263 and the 
statute of Elizabeth I concerning charitable264 uses were because of 
conflicts with local legislation.265 
Colorado (1861-1876). The Colorado organic act (1861)266 
conferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common 
law jurisdiction." In 1861 the territorial legislature passed a stat-
ute,267 similar to the Virginia Ordinance of 1776, making English 
law of 1607 the rule of decision, except specified parts of statutes 
of Elizabeth I and Henry 8.268 This statute was re-enacted by 
the state legislature, and has continued in force.269 In 1888 a 
statute of George 2210 was declared inapplicable to Colorado, 
Stallcup, C., stating: 
"The common law of England had never obtained in this 
portion of the North American continent previous to its ac-
quisition by our general government. This portion of our 
country was never under British dominion. The acquisition 
thereof was by treaty and purchase long after the Revolution, 
and from powers not having the common law, but the civil 
law; so that the first foot-hold or actual existence of the com-
mon law of England here was necessarily by legislative enact-
ments, and necessarily limited according to the expression of 
such enactments. . . . Our legislature having adopted the 
common law of England as it existed prior to the fourth year 
of the reign of James I., our courts cannot substitute a dif-
ferent date."271 
In 1885 the court had refused to apply a statute of 5 & 6 Edward 
6,272 holding that it was "irreconcilably inconsistent" with a Colo-
rado statute.273 
262 Ibid. "(I) [W]ith reference to trespass upon wild lands by cattle ••• ; (2) with 
reference to the effect of covenants to pay rent in a lease after destruction of leased 
buildings ••• ; and (3) with reference to estates by entirety •••• " 
263 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1535-1536) (statute of uses). 
264 43 Eliz. I, c. 4 (1601) (charitable gifts). 
26l'i Meng v. Coffee, 67 Neb. 500, 93 N.W. 713 (1903) (Roscoe Pound, Commissioner). 
266 Colorado Organic Act of 1861, ch. 59, § 9, 12 Stat. 174. 
267 COLORADO TERRITORIAL LAws 35 (1861). 
268 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545) (usury); 13 Eliz., c. 8 (1571) (usury); 43 Eliz. I, c. 6, § 2 
(1601) (frivolous suits). Same as "repealed" in Northwest, see note 104 supra. 
269 COLO. R.Ev. STAT. A.-;N. § 135-1-1 (1953). See also COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 153-1-1 
(Supp. 1960), for recent court application of this statute. 
270 Probably 11 Geo. 2, c. 19 (1737-1738) (distress for rent). 
271 Herr v. Johnson, 11 Colo. 393, 396, 18 Pac. 342, 343 (1888). 
272 5 &: 6 Edw. 6, c. 16 (1551-1552) (sale of offices). 
273 People ex rel. Goddard, 8 Colo. 432, 434, 7 Pac. 301, 303 (1885). In 1903, the 
court of appeals held the Statute of Uses, 1535-1536, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, had been "adopted" 
by Colorado statute, Teller v. Hill, 18 Colo. App. 509, 72 Pac. 811 (1903). 
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Nevada (1861-1864). The Nevada organic act (1861)274 con-
ferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common-law 
jurisdiction." A territorial statute passed in 1861275 declared that 
"the Common Law of England" should be the rule of decision. 
This statute, continued in force by the state constitution, was 
re-enacted by the state legislature.276 In 1865 Lewis, C.J., pointed 
out that the common law adopted "in this Country" was the com-
mon law of England "as amended or altered by British statutes 
in force at the time of the emigration of our colonial ancestors."277 
Brosnan, J., on petition for rehearing, asked: "When the common 
law of England, consisting in part of statutes, as we have shown, 
has been adopted in the United States, why may not Americans, 
like the adventurous emigrants of other nationalities, carry with 
them the common law of their country into the Territories ac-
quired since the Revolution?"278 In 1874 the Court held that an 
English statute "in force in England at the time of the declaration 
of American Independence, and being applicable to our situation, 
constitutes a part of the common law of the United States."279 A 
statute of 9 Anne280 was held to be in force in 1876281 and 1909.282 
Dakota (1861-1889). The Dakota organic act (1861)283 con-
ferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common-law 
jurisdiction." At its first session the territorial legislature adopted 
codes of criminal and civil procedure. The "Field" Civil Code 
was adopted in 1865. Criminal procedure was to be "according 
to the course of the common law," except when the Code pointed 
out a different mode.284 To take care of a case not provided for 
by the Code of Civil Procedure, "common law practice" could 
be adopted "to prevent a failure of justice."285 The following 
reasons for adopting the Field Civil Code have been given: 
274 Nevada Organic Act of 1861, ch. 83, § 9, 12 Stat. 212. 
275 LAws OF NEVADA TERRITORY I (1861). 
276 NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 1.030 (1957). 
277 Hamilton v. Kneeland, I Nev. 40, 55 (1865). The statute involved was 32 Hen. 
8, c. 34 (1540) (grantees of reversions). 
278 Hamilton v. Kneeland, supra note 277, at 57. 
279 Ex parte Blanchard, 9 Nev. 101, 105 (1874). The statute involved was 10 & 11 
Will. 3, c. 17 [10 Will. 3, c. 23 (1697-1698) (suppression of lotteries)]. 
2so 9 Anne, c. 14 [19] (1710) (gaming). 
281 Evans v. Cook, 11 Nev. 69 (1876). 
282 Burke v. Buck, 31 Nev. 74, 99 Pac. 1078 (1909). 
283 Territory of Dakota Act of 1861, ch. 86, § 9, 12 Stat. 241. 
284 DAKOTA TERRITORIAL LAws § 187, at 205-06 (1862). As amended in 1875 [DAKOTA 
TERRITORIAL LAws § 526, at 162 (1874)] the code directed that practice not specifically 
provided for should be "in accordance with the procedure, practice and pleadings of 
the common law, and assimilated as near as may be with the procedure, practice and 
pleadings of the United States or federal side of said courts." Ibid. 
285 DAKOTA TERRITORIAL LAws § 378, at 117 (1867). 
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"In 1865, the very year of the submission of the Field 
civil code, it was adopted by the legislature of Dakota Ter-
ritory. The popularity of the code in a frontier community, 
and its lack of popularity in the older states of the east, is 
not surprising. A young state, without any local legal tradi-
tion, confronted with the problems of pioneer life, would 
naturally welcome a legislative summary of the experience of 
the eastern states in reconciling the rules of the English com-
mon law to American conditions. When the Field code was 
published, American law had just completed the period dur-
ing which judges and text-writers, such as Kent and Story, 
had fixed the general principles of American private law. 
The Field code was an epitome of this reaction of a com-
munity still largely imbued with the frontier spirit to a sys-
tem of law which had developed in an older civilization under 
different conditions. Since its drafting, it has been adopted, 
with minor changes, in five Western states: in North and 
South Dakota, in California in 1872, in Idaho in 1887, and 
in Montana in 1895."286 
In 1924 a judge of the North Dakota Supreme Court pointed out: 
"Our legislature has distinctly recognized the common law as ap-
plicable in certain cases in the absence of statute."287 
Arizona (1863-1912). The Arizona organic act (1863)288 con-
ferred on the territorial judges the same jurisdiction as had been 
conferred on the judges of New Mexico, and provided that "all 
legislative enactments of the Territory of New Mexico not in-
consistent with the provisions of this act," should continue in 
force until amended or repealed. In 1864 the territorial legisla-
ture provided that "the common law of England" should be "the 
rule of decision."289 In 1887 this was amended to read: 
286 Harrison, The First Ralf-Century of the California Civil Code, IO CALIF. L. REv. 
185, 187 (1922). 
287 Bank of Conway v. Stary, 51 N.D. 399, 410, 200 N.W. 505, 509 (1924). In McKean, 
British Statutes in American Jurisdictions, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1929), the author states: 
"It is also doubtful whether there be any British acts of Parliament which would be 
recognized as part of the law of North Dakota or South Dakota. A careful scrutiny of 
the indexes of the North Dakota and South Dakota reports fails to bring to light any 
satisfactorily definite ruling on acts of Parliament. This may be due to the haphazard-
ness of litigation. The North Dakota case of Pratt v. Pratt [29 N.D. 531, 536, 151 N.W. 
294, 295 (1915)] defines the common law as containing no statute of limitations, a 
proposition which goes far towards establishing the principle that no British statutes 
form part of the common law of North Dakota ••.. " Id. at 207. 
288 Arizona Organic Act of 1863, ch. 56, § 2, 12 Stat. 665. 
289 THE HOWELL CODE § 7, at 440 (1865). This act further provided: "Sec. I. All 
laws, customs, ordinances, and decrees of the Mexican Republic; all laws, customs, 
ordinances, and decrees of the kingdom of Spain; and all legislative enactments of the 
Tcnitory of New Mexico, now or heretofore in force in this Territory, are hereby 
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"The common law of England so far only as it is con-
sistent with and adapted to the natural and physical condi-
tion of this territory, and the necessities of the people thereof, 
and not repugnant to, or inconsistent with the constitution 
of the United States, or bill of rights, or laws of this territory, 
or established customs of the people of this territory, is hereby 
adopted and shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of 
this territory."290 
Re-enacted by the state legislature, it is still in force.291 In 1937 
Lockwood, J ., of the state supreme court, after quoting from a 
New Mexico case decided in 1886,292 stated: 
"We agree that the rule laid down by the Supreme Court 
of New Mexico is the one applicable to Arizona, and hold 
that the 'common law' referred to by our legislature at var-
ious times means the unwritten or common law of England, 
together with the acts of parliament of a general nature, and 
not local to Great Britain, which had been passed and were 
enforced at the time of our separation from the mother coun-
try so far, of course, as they are suitable to our wants, condi-
tions, and circumstances. 
"It is plain from this definition that the statute of limita-
tions of 21 James 1293 falls within this category."294 
Idaho (1863-1890). The Idaho organic act (1863)295 conferred 
on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common-law juris-
diction." In 1864 the territorial legislature declared that "the com-
mon law of England" should be "the law of the land."200 At the 
repealed ••• .'' Powell, Perpetuities in Arizona, 1 Aruz. L. REv. 225, 253 (1959), states: 
"The first act of the legislative assembly empowered the Governor 'to appoint a com-
missioner to prepare and report a code of laws for the use and consideration of the 
legislature.' Associate Justice William T. Howell, fresh from the Michigan borrowings 
from New York, produced the 'Howell Code,' modelled on the laws of New York, 
Michigan, and California.'' After pointing out (id. at 228) that "down to 1830," that 
is, down to the adoption of the New York Revised Statutes of 1830, "no English 
speaking jurisdiction had adopted a topically organized set of statutes," Powell traces 
(id. at 230) the influence of the New York experience into Michigan, Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, the Dakotas, and Arizona. 
290 Aruz. REv. STAT. § 2935, at 523 (1887). 
291 ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 1-201 (1956). 
292 Browning v. Estate of Browning, 3 N.M. (3 Gild., E.W.S. ed.) 659, 9 Pac. 677 
(1886). See text accompanying note 221 supra. 
293 Statute of Limitations, 1623-1624, 21 James 1, c. 16. For application of Statute 
of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 34, see Pendleton v. Brown, 25 Ariz. 604, 613, 221 
Pac. 213, 216-17 (1923). 
294 Masury &: Son v. Bisbee Lumber Co., 49 Ariz. 443, 463, 68 P.2d 679, 688 (1937). 
295 Idaho Organic Act of 1863, ch. 117, § 9, 12 Stat. 811. 
296 LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF IDAHO 527 (1864). 
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time the Field Civil Code was adopted (1887) (see Dakota supra) 
the act was revised to read: 
"The common law of England, so far as it is not repug-
nant to, or inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, in all cases not provided for in these Revised 
Statutes, is the rule of decision in all the Courts of this Ter-
ritory."207 
This statute was re-enacted by the state legislature and has con-
tinued in force.298 In a discussion of "British Statutes in Ameri-
can Jurisdictions," McKean stated in 1929: 
"No indexes seem to refer to any British statutes as being 
in force in Idaho. This is not conclusive, for it is frequently 
the case in other jurisdictions that useful rules of decision are 
found in the reports, which are not covered by official syllabi, 
and, as a matter of personal observation, many British statutes 
have been found, in the course of preparing this article, which 
are not indexed at all. The Idaho statute, which recognizes 
as part of its legal system 'the common law of England,' is sim-
ilar to those of California, and Nevada, which, as already 
stated, construe the phrase 'common law of England' as in-
cluding pertinent British statutes."299 
An explanation of the absence of cases dealing with British stat-
utes may be found in the fact that the Field Civil Code incorpo-
rated all British statutes deemed desirable. In one of the Cali-
fornia cases referred to by McKean the court, after citing the 
section of the Code making "the common law of England" the rule 
of decision, stated: 
"It would be strange, indeed, if our legislature should 
have designed to limit the applicability of the code section 
to the ancient and frequently most barbarous rules and cus-
toms of the common law, and in so doing refuse to take into 
account the mitigation of their harshness and the broadening 
of the rules themselves which followed the successive enact-
ments of the English statutes. To the contrary, we hold that 
our legislature in its use of the phrase 'common law' had in 
contemplation the whole body of that jurisprudence as it 
stood, influenced by statute, at the time when the code sec-
tion was adopted."300 
207 IDAHO R.Ev. STAT. §§ 18, 63 (1887) (a general provision "applicable to all codes'). 
208 IDAHO CODE §§ 73-116 (1949). 
299 McKean, supra note 287, at 201. 
soo Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 293, 168 Pac. 135, 136 (1917). Shaw, J., 
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This case, according to McKean, "recognized the doctrine of the 
statute of 11 Henry VIII, Chapter 12 (1519), enacted to help 
and speed poor persons in their suits."301 
Montana (1864-1889). The Montana organic act (1864)302 con-
ferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common-law 
jurisdiction." In 1865 the territorial legislature provided that 
"the common law of England, so far as the same is applicable 
and of a general nature" should be the rule of decision.303 This 
provision304 now reads the same as the Idaho statute of 1887 
(supra).305 After referring to the statute as revised, a justice of 
the state supreme court stated in 1925: 
"The common law of England means that body of juris-
prudence as applied and modified by the courts of this 
country up to the time it became a rule of decision in this 
commonwealth; that time began with our first territorial 
Legislature. "306 
When the Field Civil Code was adopted in 1895 the following 
was enacted: 
"In this state there is no common law in any case where 
the law is declared by the code or the statute; but where 
not so declared, if the same is applicable and of a general 
nature, and not in conflict with the code or other statutes, 
the common law shall be the law and rule of decision."307 
Absence of state cases dealing with British statutes308 may be ex-
plained, as in Dakota and Idaho, by the fact that the Field Civil 
Code incorporated all British statutes deemed desirable. In this 
connection it should be noted that many territorial legislatures 
including Montana adopted codes of civil procedure based on the 
Field Code of 1848.309 Hepburn states: 
dissented at 299-300, 168 Pac. at 139, from the statement that the "common law of 
England" includes the law "as it stood influenced by statute" when the code section 
was adopted in 1850. "In 1850 there were in England, I have no doubt, many general 
acts of parliament in force which no one would claim were adopted as parts of our 
law by the act of our legislature." 
301 McKean, supra note 287, at 198. The statute involved was 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 
(1495) (suing in forma pauperis). 
302 Montana Organic Act of 1864, ch. 95, § 9, 13 Stat. 88. 
303 Acrs, REsOLUTIONS AND MEMORIALS OF THE TERRITORY OF MONTANA 356 (1866). 
304 REV. CODES OF MONTANA § 12-103 (1955). 
305 See note 297 supra. 
306 Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 594, 241 Pac. 328, 330 (1925). 
307 MONTANA CODES AND STATUTES, CIVIL CODE § 4651, at 754 (Sanders ed. 1895). 
308 McKean, supra note 287, at 201, 207. 
309 HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING 95-113 (1897). 
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"Montana also has received its legislation very largely from 
California. Early in 1865 the provisions of the California 
practice act were substantially adopted by the :first legislature 
of Montana in an act to regulate proceedings in civil cases. 
There was a revision in 1879, when a code of civil procedure 
framed on the lines of the California statute was adopted, as 
part of a general body of laws. In 1895 the fourth regular 
session of the state legislature revised and reenacted this code, 
along with the other codes of Montana, but in all this the 
lines of the California codes were carefully observed."310 
As codification progressed, reliance on British statutes tended to 
disappear. 
Wyoming (1868-1890). The Wyoming organic act (1868)311 
conferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common 
law jurisdiction." The act further provided "that all general ter-
ritorial laws of the Territory of Dakota in force in any portion 
of said Territory of Wyoming," except specified mining laws, 
should continue in force "throughout the said Territory until 
repealed." In 1869312 the territorial legislature enacted a statute, 
similar to the Virginia Ordinance, making English law of 1607, 
with the exception of three specified statutes,313 the rule of deci-
sion. In 1886 the legislature provided: 
"If a case ever arise in which an action or proceeding for the 
enforcement or protection of a right, or the redress or pre-
vention of a wrong, cannot be had under this title, the prac-
tice of the common law may be adopted, so far as it may 
be necessary to prevent a failure of justice."314 
At this time the code of civil procedure, adopted from Ohio in 
1869, was revised to follow the Ohio procedure code "with even 
more literal exactness than before."315 The statute making Eng-
lish law of 1607 the rule of decision was re-enacted by the state 
legislature, and has continued in force.316 In applying this statute 
the state supreme court has given force to a statute of 32 Henry 
310 Id. at 108. 
311 Wyoming Organic Act of 1868, ch. 235, § 9, 15 Stat. 181. 
312 GENERAL LAWS, MEMORIALS AND REsoLUTIONS OF THE TERRITORY OF '\\TYOMlNG 291-92 
(1870). 
313 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545) (usury); 13 Eliz. 1, c. 8 (1571) (usury); 43 Eliz. 1, c. 6, § 2 
(1601) (frivolous suits). Same as "repealed" in Northwest, note 104 supra. 
SH WYO. REv. STAT., CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 3153, at 686 (1887). 
315 HEPBURN, op. cit. supra note 309, at 110. 
316 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-17 (1957). 
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8,317 but denied force to an English statute passed in 1677.318 
In 1940 Blume, J., stated: 
"That section provides in brief that the common law of 
England of a general nature in force in 1607 is the law of 
this state except as it has been modified by judicial decisions, 
and except in so far as it is inconsistent with the law of this 
state. . .. The common law is not exactly the common law 
of 1607 .... Our statute (Sec. 26-101) does not state what 
are the judicial decisions to which reference is made. How-
ever, it is, and has been, the constant practice of courts in 
common law jurisdictions to freely cite cases from other com-
mon-law courts, and we take it that the legislature had in 
mind the judicial decisions of all the various jurisdictions."319 
The qualification "as modified by judicial decisions" appears in 
the original territorial statute. 
Alaska (1884-1959). An act of Congress approved in 1884 
declared that the "general laws of the State of Oregon" then in 
force should be the law of Alaska. 320 In a criminal code for Alaska 
adopted in 1899 Congress provided: "The common law of Eng-
land as adopted and understood in the United States shall be in 
force in said District, except as modified by this act."321 In a civil 
code adopted for Alaska in 1900 this provision appears: 
"So much of the common law as is applicable and not 
inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or 
with any law passed or to be passed by the Congress is adopted 
and declared to be the law within the district of Alaska. "322 
This provision, amended in 1933 to require consistency with acts 
of the territorial legislature,323 continued in force until the end 
of the territorial government.324 After quoting the above acts of 
Congress a district judge stated in 1902: 
"In Patterson v. Winn, 5 Pet. 241, 8 L.Ed.108, it is said, 
'The term "common law" means both the common law of 
England, as opposed to written or statute law, and the statutes 
317 Investors Guar. Corp. v. Thomson, 31 Wyo. 264, 225 Pac. 590 (1924). The statute 
involved was 32 Hen. 8, c. 34 (1540) (grantees of reversions). 
318 Barber v. Smythe, 59 Wyo. 468, 143 P.2d 565 (1943). The statute involved was 
the Statute of Frauds (1677), 29 Car. 2, c. 3. 
319 Naab v. Smith, 55 Wyo. 181, 192-93, 97 P.2d 677, 681 (1940). 
320 Act Providing Civil Government for Alaska, ch. 53, § 7, 23 Stat. 25 (1884). 
321 Ar.AsKA CRIM. CODE, ch. 429, tit. I, § 218, 30 Stat. 1285 (1899). 
322 ALAsKA CIVIL CODE, ch. 786, tit. III, § 367, 31 Stat. 552 (1900). 
323 COMPILED LAws OF Ar.AsKA, CIVIL CODE § 3271, at 660 (1933). 
324 ALASKA COMPILED LAWS § 2-1-2 (1949). 
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passed before the immigration of the first settlers to America.' 
This latter definition, furnished by the court of last resort 
for Alaska, would seem to be the one that should control this 
court in its application of the common law to the case at 
bar .... 
"If Mr. Andrews [author of AMERICAN LAW (1900)] is 
right in his statement that where no particular time is men-
tioned, and the common law adopted in general terms in-
cludes not only the common law proper, but all statutes in 
aid thereof prior to the Declaration of Independence, then 
the statute of 29 Charles II is part and parcel of the common 
law to be administered by the courts of Alaska.''325 
In 1903 a district judge of another division stated: 
"But the old common-law rule in England had been 
changed prior to our independence by the statute of Geo. III, 
c.18 .... At the date of our independence that statute was 
in force. It seems to follow, logically, that the old common-
law rule never became the rule in the United States, for the 
statute of Geo. III, being in amendment of the common law 
and applicable to our condition, became the rule instead. 
However this may be . . . .''326 
In neither case was it necessary for the judge to determine whether 
the particular English statute was a part of Alaska's common law. 
Under the acts of Congress the judges of Alaska were to look to 
the decisions of all the states and territories to see what principles 
and rules originally English had been found applicable to Amer-
ican conditions. These principles and rules, whether originated 
by English decision or statute or both, were to serve as the source 
of Alaska's common law. 
Oklahoma (1890-1907). The Oklahoma organic act (1890)327 
conferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common 
law jurisdiction." The act extended to the part of Indian Terri-
tory organized as Oklahoma specified statutes of Nebraska,328 and 
to the remainder of Indian Territory specified statutes of Arkan-
325 Valentine v. Roberts, 1 Alaska 536, 541-42, 544 (1902). The statute referred to 
was 29 Car. 2, c. 7 (1677) (service of process on Sunday). See also text accompanying 
note 139 supra for the Michigan treatment of the same statute. 
326 In re Burkell, 2 Alaska 108, 119 (1903). The statute referred to was 10 Geo. 3, 
c. 18 (I 770) (dog stealing). 
827 Oklahoma-Indian Territory Act of 1890, ch. 182, § 9, 26 Stat. 85. 
828 The list included the Nebraska provision for "common law" (see notes 258 and 
259 supra) but was to be in force only until the adjournment of the first session of the 
Oklahoma legislature. 
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sas.329 In 1893 the Oklahoma legislature provided that "the com-
mon law, as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial 
decisions and the condition and wants of the people" should re-
main in force. 330 This statute was re-enacted by the state legisla-
ture and is still in force.331 In 1893 the territorial supreme court 
found it necessary to decide whether English common law, includ-
ing the Statute of Frauds (1677), was in force in Indian Territory 
in 1889. Burford, J., stated: 
"It is contended that prior to the settlement of Oklahoma, 
and until the same was superseded by statutory laws, the code 
Napoleon, or civil law prevailed. 
"Whatever may have been the laws of the country now 
known as Oklahoma, they ceased to operate in the region 
originally comprising the Indian Territory when the Ter-
ritory ceased to be a part of the Territory of Louisiana and 
the laws of the Territory of Indiana and the Territory of 
Missouri, which may have once prevailed in said region, be-
came inoperative in and ceased to have any force or effect 
in the Indian Territory when that Territory ceased to be a 
part of said Territories .... "332 
If, the judge continued, it should be conceded that the congres-
sional act of March 1, 1889, providing a court for Indian Terri-
tory, did not "put the common law in force" except so far as was 
necessary to execute the powers of the court, 
"then it necessarily follows, on principle, that when people 
from all parts of the United States, on the 22d day of April, 
1889, settled the country known as Oklahoma, built cities, 
towns and villages, and began to carry on trade and commerce 
in all its various branches, they brought into Oklahoma, with 
them, the established principles and rules of the common 
law as recognized and promulgated by the American courts, 
and as it existed when imported into this country by our 
early settlers, and unmodified, by American or English stat-
utes."333 
In 1908 a justice of the state supreme court cited this case to 
329 The list included the Arkansas provision for "common and statute law of Eng-
land"-the act inherited by Arkansas from Missouri making English common law and 
statutes prior to 1607 the rule of decision. See Arkansas, in text at note 165 supra, 
830 STATUTES OF OKLA. § 3874 (CODE OF Crv. PROC. § 2) (1893). 
831 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2 (1960). 
832 McKennon v. Winn, 1 Okla. 327, 333-34, 33 Pac. 582, 584 (1893). The statute 
involved was the Statute of Frauds (1677), 29 Car. 2, c. 3, 
333 McKennon v. Winn, supra note 332, at 334-35, 33 Pac. at 585. 
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support a statement that "when the people in 1889 came from 
the different states into Oklahoma, they brought with them the 
rules of the common law as recognized and promulgated by the 
American courts."334 He then referred to the statute335 which had 
provided that the common law, as modified by constitutional and 
statutory law, judicial decisions, and the conditions and want of 
the people, should remain in force. 
Hawaii (1900-1959). The Hawaii organic act (1900)336 pro-
vided that "the laws of Hawaii not inconsistent with the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States" should continue in force. 
In 1903 the territorial legislature amended section 5 of Chapter 
LVII of the Laws of 1892, Kingdom of Hawaii, to read as follows: 
"The common law of England, as ascertained by English 
and American decisions is hereby declared to be the common 
law of the Territory of Hawaii in all cases, except as other-
wise expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, or by the laws of the Territory of Hawaii, or 
fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Ha-
waiian usage, provided, however that no person shall be sub-
ject to criminal proceedings except as provided by the written 
laws of the United States or of the Territory of Hawaii."337 
This statute continued in force throughout the territorial pe-
riod.338 In 1911 Perry, J., of the territorial supreme court, de-
clared: 
"The statutes of George IV. (1827) and of Victoria (1848 
& 1849) were enacted too recently to be regarded, in any pos-
sible meaning of that term as used in R.L., §1, as a part of 
the common law of England. Whether the early statutes of 
Philip & Mary (1553, 1554 & 1555) should be so regarded ... 
need not be determined."339 
In 1912 the court held that a statute of 13 Elizabeth 1 was "a part 
of" the territorial common law,340 stating that "had the principle" 
of the statute "not been previously recognized we would not hesi-
334 Hoppe Hardware Co. v. Bain, 21 Okla. 177, 182, 95 Pac. 765, 767 (1908). 
335 OKLA. R.Ev. ANN. STAT. § 4200 (Wilson's ed. 1903). 
336 Hawaiian Organic Act of 1900, ch. 339, § 6, 31 Stat. 142. 
337 HAWAII R.Ev. LAws 83 (1905). 
338 HAWAII R.Ev. LAws § 1-1 (1955). 
839 In re Craig, 20 Hawaii 447, 450 (1911). The statutes referred to were 1 &: 2 
Ph. &: M., c. 13, § 5 (1554-1555) (criminal law); 2 &: 3 Ph. &: M., c. 10 (1555) (criminal 
law); 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, § 2 (1826) (criminal law); 11 &: 12 Viet., c. 42, § 20 (1847-1848) 
(indictable offenses). 
HO Dee v. Foster, 21 Hawaii 1, 3 (1912). The statute referred to was 13 Eliz. 1, c. 5 
(1571) (fraudulent conveyances). 
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tate to hold that it was incorporated into our law by the provision 
of the Judiciary Act of 1892." 
Unincorporated Territories. To give in any detail the sources 
of law prescribed for the unincorporated territories (Philippines, 
Puerto Rico, Guam, Samoa, Canal Zone, and Trust Territory in 
the Pacific) would extend too far this already tedious recital. Each 
has presented a different problem, and the various solutions are 
intriguing. It would also be of value to include the District of 
Columbia, and the Republic of Texas. The treatment of British 
statutes in the District has been unique.841 Developments in areas 
previously governed by Spanish law (Philippines, Puerto Rico, 
Canal Zone, and Texas) should be compared with those in Louisi-
ana. The Virgin Islands should be examined for remains of the 
law of Denmark. But, as stated at the beginning of this discussion, 
the detailed treatment is limited to the territories which have be-
come states. Indian Territory has been noticed briefly under 
Oklahoma. 
Summary and Comment. When Congress was in doubt whether 
the English system of law or the Spanish system should furnish 
the rule of decision (Orleans, Mo., Ark., Fla.), the courts were 
given jurisdiction of "criminal" and "civil" cases, and the pre-
established law was continued in force. When Congress intended 
that the English system should furnish the rule of decision, pro-
visions such as the following were enacted: 
Superior judges to have a common law jurisdiction. N.W., 
So., Miss., Ind., La., Mich., Ill. 
Inhabitants entitled to benefits of judicial proceedings ac-
cording to course of common law. N.W., So., Miss., Ind., 
Orleans, Mich., Ill., Mo., Wis., Iowa, Oregon, Minn. 
Superior judges to have chancery as well as common law jur-
isdiction. Ind., Mich., Ill., Mo., Wis., Iowa, Oregon, 
Minn., N.M., Utah, Wash., Kan., Neb., Colo., Nev., Dak., 
Ariz., Idaho, Mont., Wyo., Okla. 
Common law of England as adopted and understood in the 
United States to be in force. Alaska. 
841 See D.C. CODE ANN., Historical Introduction, ix-xiv (1961). According to Cox, 
J., "Mr. Albert included in his [1894] compilation the old English statutes in force in 
the Colonies, including Maryland, or supposed by him to be so, from Magna Charta 
to the thirteenth of George III, in the year 1773 •.•. The old English statutes 
and some of the old Maryland statutes abound in antiquated English and redundant 
verbiage, which it was unnecessary to re-enact, and many provisions in them are now 
inapplicable and obsolete by reason of changes in the practice of the courts and social 
and political conditions but it was historically correct to print the entire statutes con-
taining them." Id. at xiii. A list of British statutes included in the D.C. CODE ANN. (1961) 
will be found in volume III, at 2089. For illustrations, see "Waste," §§ 45-1301 to 1303. 
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So much of common law as is applicable adopted and declared 
to be law. Alaska. 
Confusion resulted from extending to Orleans the benefits of 
judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law 
while continuing in force the prior Spanish law. 
The provision extending to Alaska the common law of Eng-
land as adopted and understood in the United States was the only 
one in which Congress indicated what "common law" was in-
tended, and this was accompanied by a more general provision. 
For Congress to have been specific it would have been necessary 
to designate the common law of some particular jurisdiction as 
of a particular time. Each territory was open to settlement by 
persons from all existing states and territories, and it was early 
recognized that the laws of no one state should be imposed. There 
was early talk of colonial common law, but as observed by Pro-
fessor Tucker in 1803, " ... neither the common law of England, 
nor the statutes of that kingdom, were, at any period antecedent 
to the revolution, the general and uniform law of the land in 
the British colonies."342 
"Being perfectly independent of each other," the colonies 
pursued independent courses "until, like the radii of a circle, 
they arrived from the same common center to points diametrically 
opposite, or receding from each other in proportion to the length 
they were extended."343 In the one instance where an attempt 
was made to extend the law of a colony and original state to a 
territory (South of the Ohio), want of information made it im-
possible to determine matters which depended "upon usage and 
the decisions of the superior courts."344 It was only after reports 
of decisions were being regularly published in all American juris-
dictions that Congress declared that in Alaska the common law 
of England "as adopted and understood in the United States" 
should be in force. 
Finding no one body of American common law, and no means 
of knowing what each colony and original state had adopted for 
itself, Congress could have gone to the center of Professor Tucker's 
circle-to the common law of England. But to have done so-
whatever date might have been selected-would have eliminated 
all prior American experience. Settlers with different ideas of 
342 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE 432 (1803). 
343 Id. at 392. 
SH Glasgow's Lessee v. Smith 8: Black.well, I Tenn. (Overton) 144, 153 (1805). 
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what the common law was or should be would have had to adopt 
their own common law. 
Turning from acts of Congress to acts of the territorial legis-
latures we find a variety of provisions. Those illustrating attempts 
to solve the problem of British statutes will be listed first: 
Common law of England and statutes in aid of the common 
law before 1607, the rule of decision. 
Common and statute law of England down to 1776 in force. 
Selected British statutes re-enacted; all others not in force. 
No British statutes considered law. 
Specified British statutes in force. 
Specified British statutes not in force. 
Ways of designating common law as a source of law without re-
ferring to British statutes are illustrated by the following: 
Inhabitants entitled to benefits of judicial proceedings ac-
cording to course of common law. 
Specified courts to hear and determine according to course 
of common law. 
Chancery proceedings to be regulated by rules of English 
chancery. 
Criminal proceedings to conform to English common law. 
Common law as recognized by or in the United States to be 
the rule of practice and decision. 
Common law in force. 
Common law the rule of decision. 
So much of the common law of England as applicable de-
clared law. 
Common law of England to be the rule of decision. 
Common law of England as ascertained by English and Amer-
ican decisions to be the common law. 
To see the problem faced by the territorial governments it 
is necessary to have in mind: (1) There was no "general and uni-
form" common law of the original colonies as a group or of the 
group of states formed from the colonies. (2) The adoptions of 
common law in the individual colonies and original states were 
buried in materials not available in the territories. (3) Settlers in 
a territory from a particular state might have knowledge of the 
common law of that state, but had no way of imposing it on 
settlers from other states. (4) The English common law as ad-
ministered in the king's courts was a single body of law available 
in print. The Virginia Ordinance of 1776 had declared 
"That the common law of England, all statutes or acts of 
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Parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the 
fourth year of the reign of King James the first, and which 
are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom, together 
with the several acts of the General Assembly of this colony 
now in force, so far as the same may consist with the several 
ordinances, declarations, and resolutions of the General Con-
vention, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered 
as in full force, until the same shall be altered by the legis-
lative power of this colony."345 
It is not surprising that many of the territorial governments found 
in the Virginia act a solution of their problem. 
Territorial statutes based on the Virginia Ordinance of 1776 
were in force for varying periods of time in Northwest, Indiana, 
Michigan, Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Colorado, 
and Wyoming. While it was obvious that no British statute could 
have the force of a statute in an American territory after the 
change of sovereignty, the view that applicable British statutes 
were made territorial statutes by legislative adoption was widely 
held. In Northwest the territorial legislature in form "repealed"346 
specified parts of statutes of 37 Hen. 8 (1545), 13 Eliz. 1 (1571), and 
43 Eliz. I (1601) after the act based on the Virginia Ordinance 
was adopted. 347 In five of the later territories the provisions "re-
pealed" by Northwest were expressly excepted from the operation 
of the general statute.348 
In 1776 Thomas Jefferson left Congress to participate in a 
program to revise the laws of Virginia. As a member of a legis-
lative committee he undertook to draft bills that would modify 
the common law and supplant English statutes enacted prior to 
1607. Commenting on the report of this committee (1779) he 
stated in his Memoirs in 1829: 
"We had in this work, brought so much of the Common 
law as it was thought necessary to alter, all British statutes 
from Magna Charta to the present day, and all the laws of 
Virginia, from the establishment of our legislature, in the 
4th Jae.I. to the present time, which we thought should be 
345 1 THE REVISED CODE OF THE LA.ws OF VIRGINIA 135 (1819). 
346 See 1 CHASE 218, 238, 293; PEASE 353, 401. See also OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL 
DECISIONS PRIOR TO 1823, at 211 (Pollack ed. 1952). 
347 The statutes "repealed" were 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545) (usury); 13 Eliz. 1, c. 8 (1571) 
(usury); 43 Eliz. 1, c. 6, § 2 (1601) (frivolous suits). 
348 Cf. McKean, British Statutes in American Jurisdictions, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 195, 
211 n.97 (1929). 
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retained, within the compass of one hundred and twenty-six 
bills, making a printed folio of ninety pages only."349 
The program of revision thus commenced was completed in 1792 
by a statute which recited that the General Assembly had thought 
it advisable "specially to enact" such acts of Parliament "as to 
them appear worthy of adoption, and do not already make a part 
of the public code of the laws of Virginia."350 The statute pro-
vided: 
"That so much of the above recited ordinance [of 1776] 
as relates to any statute or act of parliament, shall be, and is 
hereby repealed; and that no such statute or act of parlia-
ment shall have any force or authority within this Common-
wealth."351 
At about the same time programs of revisal and repeal were un-
dertaken in New York (1786-1788); New Jersey (I 792-1799); Ver-
mont (1797). Similar programs were undertaken in two of the 
territories: Mississippi (1807) and Michigan (1810-1821). 
The Virginia revisal was not a code, but a statutory revision 
which included British as well as Virginia statutes, plus, accord-
ing to Jefferson, "so much of the common law" as the committee 
thought necessary to alter. The Virginia Revised Code of 1819 
contains side-margin references to "the English statutes in pari 
materia." A tabulation of these references is attached (appendix, 
infra) to demonstrate the magnitude of the British statute prob-
lem.352 
In 1848 New York adopted a true code limited to pleading, 
joinder, and some other phases of civil procedure. Codes based 
on this code were adopted in: Minnesota 1851; Oregon 1854; 
Washington 1854; Nebraska 1855; Kansas 1859; Nevada 1861; 
Dakota 1862; Idaho 1864; Arizona 1864; Montana 1865; Wyoming 
1869; Oklahoma 1890.353 
In general it may be said that as bodies of statutory law were 
developed, reliance on British and other prior statutes tended to 
disappear. The source of decisional law was prior decisional law. 
349 1 MEMOIRS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 36 (1829). 
350 1 THE REvISED CODE OF THE LAws OF VmGINIA 137 (1819). 
351 Ibid. 
352 Mrs. Brown, co-author of the present article, has recently completed an extensive 
study of British Statutes in American Law 1776-1836. This study, to be published this 
year by the University of Michigan Law School, does not include re-enacted British 
statutes, but does show in full detail which British statutes were adopted or rejected 
as "rules of decision" in the period covered. 
353 HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING 95-113 (1897). 
1963] TERRITORIAL COURTS AND LAW 523 
The decisional law of the colonies being inaccessible, the courts 
were forced to look to English decisions and such American de-
cisions as had been reported. Reliance on English decisions prior 
to Independence was considered proper, but more and more the 
tendency was to look to American decisions, especially those in 
which the adaptability of a rule originally English to American 
conditions had been considered. 
EXTENT OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 
The first plan of government for the "western territory" (1784) 
provided that settlers on any purchased territory might adopt "the 
constitution and laws of any one of the original states."354 This 
plan was approved by the Congress of the Confederation but 
never put into operation. A later proposal that Congress establish 
in the area the laws of a state designated by Congress355 was not 
approved, nor was a proposal that the territorial judges agree on 
the criminal laws "of some one state."356 The plan finally adopted 
(Ordinance of 1787)357 provided that the territorial governor and 
judges adopt and publish "such laws of the original states, crim-
inal and civil," as might be "necessary and best suited to the cir-
cumstances of the district." This plan was to be followed until 
there should be 5,000 free male inhabitants of full age in the 
territory, when a general assembly (governor, council, and repre-
sentatives) might be established. 
I. Extent of Power To "Adopt" Laws 
The scheme of legislation under which territorial governors 
and judges were to "adopt" laws of the original states was made 
applicable to the following territories and was in operation during 
the years indicated: Northwest 1788-1798; South (later Tennessee) 
I 790-1794; Mississippi 1798-1800; Indiana 1800-1804; Michigan 
1805-1823; Illinois 1809-1812. In Louisiana (north of Orleans) 
(1804-1812) and in Arkansas (1819), the governor and judges were 
authorized to "make" or "pass" laws, and were not, as in the other 
territories listed, limited to "adoption" from "original" states. 
The extent of the power given by the "adoption" provision 
was in dispute from the beginning. In 1788 two of the judges 
of Northwest stated to the governor: 
Mi 26 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 276 (1928). 
355 l!O id. at 252, 253 (19l!4). 
356 l!l id. at 670 (19l!4). 
357 1 Stat. 51 n.(a). 
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"We think it will admit of two constructions. One, that 
we can adopt laws of any of the old states literatim et verba-
tim, mutatis et mutandis for their State only. The other that 
we may admit such parts of any particular law as will be 
necessary, etc. If so, why will it not admit of another con-
struction, that we may adopt a law, consisting of different 
parts of laws of any two or more States upon the same subject? 
And if this be granted, surely the diction ought to be ren-
dered uniform."858 
The governor conceded that adoption of parts of a law might 
be proper, but disagreed with the view that the governor and 
judges might "make" a law consisting of different parts of laws 
of different states.359 In 1795, after the United States House of 
Representatives had disapproved Northwest laws published in 
1792,360 the governor informed the judges that their acts had been 
disapproved because they had only power to "adopt," not power 
to "make."361 In 1799, after reciting that it had been represented 
that on several occasions laws had been "enacted" by the governor 
and judges "of their own authority," and that those laws were of 
very doubtful obligation, and had been so spoken of from the 
bench, the General Assembly confirmed all laws published prior 
to 1795 which had not been repealed.362 
Commencing in 1795 the governor and judges of Northwest 
recited in each law published the state from which adopted. From 
that time to the establishment of the General Assembly (1799) 
the laws published recited adoptions from Connecticut (2); Ken-
tucky (4); Massachusetts (8); New Jersey (I); New York (2); Penn-
sylvania (27); Virginia (3). Concerning one of the laws adopted 
from Kentucky, Salmon P. Chase, in his edition of the Northwest 
Statutes, stated in 1833: 
"The adoption of this law from the statutes of Kentucky, 
which was not one of the original states, was unauthorized 
by the ordinance. The law itself, therefore, never was con-
stitutionally in force, within the territory."368 
In an address to the General Assembly in 1799 the governor ob-
358 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 70 (Smith ed. 1882). 
359 Id. at 75. 
360 ANNALS OF CONG., 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 1214, 1227 (1849). 
361 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 356-57 (Smith ed. 1882). 
362 LAws oF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY 1788-1800, at 337 (Pease ed. 1925). See also 
Governor St. Clair's address to the General Assembly, 2 THE ST. CLAIR. PAPERS 451-53 
(Smith ed. 1882). 
363 1 STATUTES OF OHIO AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY 205n. (Chase ed. 1833). 
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served: "As Kentucky was not a state when this government was 
erected, the validity of the law is very questionable."364 
Chase was also of opinion that the governor and judges had 
no power to adopt a repealed law.365 His comment was directed 
to the Northwest law of 1795 which had adopted the provisions 
of the Virginia Ordinance of 1776. The Ordinance had been 
repealed in 1792. 
In 1806 the chief judge of the Michigan Supreme Court re-
ported to Secretary Madison the "constructions" which the gov-
ernor and judges of Michigan had been "compelled" to give to 
their powers of legislation: 
"The operative words of the ordinance are, the governor 
and the judges, or a majority of them, shall adopt and publish 
such laws of the original states, civil and criminal, as may be 
necessary, and best suited to the circumstances of the district. 
"The provision has been deemed to constitute a kind of 
legislative board, composed of the governor and the three 
judges, any three of whom are considered to form a quorum, 
and of which quorum the votes of any two determine a ques-
tion .... 
"Under the term laws, all parts of laws have been deemed 
to be included. Hence it has not been thought necessary to 
adopt the whole of a law from one state. It has been deemed 
sufficient that all the parts of any law are sanctioned by the 
provisions of some of the states. 
"A doubt arose whether the term original states permitted 
the adoption of laws from states created subsequent to the 
date of the ordinance. 
"On this point the construction has been that the term 
original, as affecting the territory of Michigan, has the same 
force as if used in the act constituting the territory. The states 
existing previous to the erection of this territory, have been 
deemed, with respect to it, original states; and the very states 
which, by their concurrence in this law, originated this ter-
ritory. Laws have, therefore, been adopted from the states 
created since the passage of the ordinance, and anterior to the 
erection of the territory; though it has been conceived not 
proper to adopt the laws of any state which may be created 
subsequent to the establishment of the territory. 
"The discretion vested under the term necessary, has been 
construed to impart the power of omitting any part of a law 
36i 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 453 (Smith ed. 1882). 
861S 1 STATUT.ES OF OHIO AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY 190n. (Chase ed. 1833). 
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whatever; and with respect to all geographical designations, 
all expressions of time, and of number, all sums of money, all 
official or personal descriptions, and some other points of a 
similar nature, it has been indispensibly necessary to change, 
with perfect latitude, the law adopted, in order to render it, 
in any respect, suited to the circumstances of the district. 
These terms, therefore, become a formula; which may, in 
some measure, apologize to the mind of him who after so 
many mutations is scarcely able to recognize in the child 
adopted, the lineaments of the parent which gave it birth. 
"An express statutory power is given to repeal laws. Hence 
a repealing law, becomes a law made, and not a law adopted; 
and after any part of a law has been repealed, the repealing 
law proceeds to render the remainder of the law consistent 
with itself. 
"So all legislation exercised under express acts of congress, 
ceases to be the adoption, and becomes the making of laws. 
"Doubts have existed, whether there was authority to 
adopt a law which had been passed by a state, but afterwards 
altered or repealed, and how far the repeal of a law by a state, 
after its adoption by the territory, affected its subsequent va-
lidity. But no cases occurred which rendered it necessary to 
decide these questions."366 
The validity of a law "adopted" by the governor and judges 
of Michigan from New York, Massachusetts, and Ohio was con-
sidered at length by the Supreme Court and the Court of Errors 
of New York in 1830 and 1831.367 Most of the "constructions" set 
forth in the report to Madison were involved, and the same views 
expressed. Sutherland, J., of the New York Supreme Court, re-
marked: 
"It was foreseen that the population of these territories 
would be composed of emigrants from the original states, 
who, as citizens of those states, had through their representa-
tives in the state legislatures participated in the making of 
the laws, which by the ordinance in question, the governor 
and judges of the territories were authorized to adopt; this, 
together with the power reserved to congress of annulling 
such laws as they should disapprove of, was deemed a suffi-
cient guaranty that the interests and wishes of the inhabitants 
366 Preface to original Woodward Code (1806), reprinted in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
SUPREJ\IE COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at xxi-xxii (Blume ed. 1935). 
367 Bank of Michigan v. Williams, 5 Wend. 478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830), afj'd, 7 Wend. 
539 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1831). 
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would be regarded in the laws which would be imposed upon 
them. The object in view was one of substance, not of 
form."3os 
A law adopted in Michigan in 1809369 conferring on justices 
of the peace jurisdiction "not exceeding the sum of fifty dollars," 
was held valid, Woodward, J., dissenting.370 According to Wood-
ward this decision "settles the following principle; that a law au-
thorizing a Summary trial, Without a jury, in cases where the 
Value in Controversy exceeds twenty dollars, being adopted from 
an original State, is good in a territorial government."371 The 
reference to "twenty dollars" indicates that Woodward was con-
cerned with the seventh amendment to the federal constitution 
which had guaranteed jury trial in suits at common law involving 
more than twenty dollars. The other judges apparently thought 
that the power to adopt was not limited by this provision. 
2. Extent of Power To "Make" Laws 
The Northwest Ordinance (1787)372 provided that the General 
Assembly (Governor, Legislative Council, and House of Repre-
sentatives) should have authority "to make laws in all cases for 
the government of the district, not repugnant to the principles 
and Articles of this Ordinance established and declared." The 
same provision, re-enacted by reference, was made applicable to: 
the territory South of the Ohio (Tennessee) 1790373; Mississippi 
1798374; Indiana 1800375; Michigan 1805376; Illinois 1809.377 The 
Orleans organic act (1804)378 declared that the legislative powers 
of the governor and council should "extend to all rightful subjects 
868 Id. at 485. In 1807 Frederick. Bates, Secretary of Louisiana Territory (a judge 
of Michigan Territory 1805-1806), wrote: "The Governor and the Judges make the 
laws, as they adopt them in the territories east of the Mississippi. The judges expound 
and the Governor executes. This you will say is a violent concentration of powers, 
and very unlike the free institutions of your own country. It is true, tho', all things 
considered, I do not know that the wit of man could devise an order of affairs better 
suited to chasten the irregular habits of those adventurous People who are commonly 
found on a frontier." 1 THE LIFE AND PAPERS OF FREDERICK BATES 246 (Marshall ed. 1926). 
369 2 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 53 (reprint 1871). 
870 Brush v. Buck.len (1809), reported in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUI'REME COURT OF 
THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at 165 (Blume ed. 1935). 
871 Id. at 166. 
372 I Stat. 51 n.(a). 
873 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § 1, 1 Stat. 123. 
SM Mississippi Territory Act of 1798, ch. 28, § 6, 1 Stat. 550. 
871i Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 2, 2 Stat. 59. 
376 Act of 1805 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 5, § 2, 2 Stat. 209. 
377 Act of 1809 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 13, § 2, 2 Stat. 515. 
878 Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 4, 2 Stat. 284. 
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of legislation" not "inconsistent with the constitution and laws of 
the United States." Summarizing in 1955, Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
of the United States Supreme Court pointed out: 
"The legislative power of territories has customarily been 
expressed as extending to 'all rightful subjects of legislation' 
not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United 
States. This conventional phrasing was altered to subjects of 
'local application,' or 'not locally inapplicable,' in the case of 
unincorporated territories such as pre-Commonwealth Puerto 
Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam."379 
According to Frankfurter, "the United States Constitution, in-
cluding the Bill of Rights, fully applied to an 'incorporated' ter-
ritory." To "unincorporated" territories "only some essentials, 
withal undefined,'' were extended.380 
Civil Liberties. The Northwest Assembly was without power 
to "make" laws "repugnant to the principles and Articles" of 
the Northwest Ordinance. The "Articles" guaranteed religious 
freedom; habeas corpus; trial by jury; proportionate representa-
tion in the legislature; judicial proceedings according to the 
course of the common law; bail, except in capital cases; moderate 
fines; compensation for services or property taken for public use. 
The "Articles" prohibited cruel and unusual punishments; de-
privation of liberty or property but by judgment of peers or law 
of the land; legislative interference with bona fide private con-
tracts; interference with lands and property of Indians; taxation 
of nonresidents higher than residents; slavery and involuntary 
servitude. All of these protections ( except slavery indicated by t) 
were extended to: the territory South of the Ohio (Tennessee) 
I 790t381; Mississippi l 798t382; Indiana 1800383; Orleans 1805t384; 
Michigan 1805385; Illinois 1809386; Wisconsin 1836387; Iowa 1838388; 
Oregon 1848389; Minnesota 1849.390 The organic acts of each of 
the following territories provided that the Constitution of the 
379 Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 394 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1955). 
380 Id. at 5. 
381 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § 1, 1 Stat. 123. 
382 Mississippi Territory Act of 1798, ch. 28, §§ 6, 7, 1 Stat. 550. 
383 Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 2, 2 Stat. 59. 
384 Orleans Organic Act of 1805, ch. 23, § 1, 2 Stat. 322. 
385 Act of 1805 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 5, § 2, 2 Stat. 209. 
386 Act of 1809 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 13, § 2, 2 Stat. 515. 
387 Wisconsin Organic Act of 1836, ch. 54, § 12, 5 Stat. 15. 
388 Iowa Organic Act of 1838, ch. 96, § 12, 5 Stat. 239. 
389 Oregon Organic Act of 1848, ch. 177, § 14, 9 Stat. 329. 
390 Minnesota Organic Act of 1849, ch. 121, § 12, 9 Stat. 407. 
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United States should extend to and be in force within the terri-
tory: New Mexico 1850391 ; Utah 1850392; Kansas 1854393; Nebraska 
1854394; Colorado 186!395; Dakota 1861896; Nevada 1861897; Idaho 
1863398; Montana 1864899; Wyoming 1868400; Indian 1890401; 
Oklahoma 1890402; Hawaii 1900403; Alaska 1912.404 Bills of rights 
(some narrow in scope indicated by t) will be found in the or-
ganic acts of: Orleans 1804t405; Louisiana (north of Orleans) 
1804t406; Missouri 1812407; Florida 1822t408; Philippines 1902409 ; 
Puerto Rico 1917410; Guam 1950411; Virgin Islands 1954.412 
The act of March 6, 1820, which provided for the admission 
of Missouri Territory as a state, contained this further provision: 
"[I]n all that territory ceded by France to the United States, 
under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six 
degrees and thirty minutes north latitude, not included 
within the limits of the state, contemplated by this act, slavery 
and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment 
of crimes, whereof the parties shall have been duly convicted, 
shall be, and is hereby, forever prohibited . " 418 
An act approved June 19, 1862, provided: 
"[T]here shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude 
in any of the Territories of the United States now existing, 
or which may at any time hereafter be formed or acquired 
301 New Mexico Organic Act of 1850, ch. 49, § 17, 9 Stat. 452. 
302 Utah Organic Act of 1850, ch. 51, § 17, 9 Stat. 458. 
393 Nebraska-Kansas Act of 1854, ch. 59, § 32, 10 Stat. 289. 
304 Ibid. 
805 Colorado Organic Act of 1861, ch. 59, § 16, 12 Stat. 176. 
396 Territory of Dakota Act of 1861, ch. 86, § 16, 12 Stat. 244. 
397 Nevada Organic Act of 1861, ch. 83, § 16, 12 Stat. 214. 
398 Idaho Organic Act of 1863, ch. 117, § 13, 12 Stat. 813. 
300 Montana Organic Act of 1864, ch. 95, § 13, 13 Stat. 91. 
400 Wyoming Organic Act of 1868, ch. 235, § 16, 15 Stat. 183. 
-iOl Oklahoma-Indian Territory Act of 1890, ch. 182, § 28, 26 Stat. 93. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Hawaiian Organic Act of 1900, ch. 339, § 5, 31 Stat. 141. 
404 Alaska Government Act of 1912, ch. 387, § 3, 37 Stat. 512. 
-i05 Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, 2 Stat. 283. 
406 Ibid. 
-i07 Missouri Organic Act of 1812, ch. 95, § 14, 2 Stat. 747. 
-i08 Florida Organic Act of 1822, ch. 13, § 10, 3 Stat. 658. 
400 Philippine Government Act of 1902, ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 692. 
oo Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act of 1917 Gones Act), ch. 145, § 2, 39 Stat. 951. 
-ill Organic Act of Guam § 5, 64 Stat. 385 (1950), 48 U.S.C. § 1421b (1958). 
412 Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands § 3, 68 Stat. 497 (1954), 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1561 (1958). 
-il3 Missouri Enabling Act of 1820 (Missouri Compromise), ch. 22, § 8, 3 Stat. 548. 
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b~ the United States, otherwise than m punishment of 
crimes .... "414 
An act approved March 2, 1867, provided: 
"[T]he holding of any person to service or labor under the 
system known as peonage is hereby declared to be unlawful, 
and the same is hereby abolished and forever forbidden in 
the Territory of New Mexico, or in any other Territory or 
State of the United States .... "415 
In Dred Scott v. Sandford416 one of the great questions was whether 
Congress had power to exclude slavery from the territories. It 
took a war to settle that question. 
Primary Disposal of Soil. The Orleans organic act (1804)417 
declared: "The governor or legislative council shall have no power 
over the primary disposal of the soil, nor to tax the lands of the 
United States, nor to interfere with the claims to land within the 
said territory." Similar restrictions will be found among provi-
sions common to all territories in force December l, 1873.418 The 
Constitution419 had given Congress "power to dispose of and make 
all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other 
property belonging to the United States," and Congress never 
saw fit to delegate to territorial legislatures control of federal land. 
The entire territorial development was a gigantic land operation 
in which the federal government acquired title to vast areas of 
new land, and sold them in parcels to individual settlers. 
Equal Taxation. The provision of the Northwest Ordinance 
that in no case should "nonresident proprietors be taxed higher 
than residents" was one of the provisions common to all terri-
tories in force December I, 1873.420 A provision requiring equal 
and uniform taxes will be found in the Oregon organic act 
(1848),421 and in the organic acts of several other territories in-
cluding Washington (1853),422 Colorado (1861),423 Wyoming 
(1868),424 and Oklahoma (1890).425 
414 Act of June 19, 1862, ch. 110, 12 Stat. 432. 
415 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat. 546. 
416 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
417 Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 4, 2 Stat. 284. 
418 REv. STAT. § 1851 (1875). 
419 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
420 REv. STAT. § 1851 (1875). 
421 Oregon Organic Act of 1848, ch. 177, § 6, 9 Stat. 325. 
422 Washington Organic Act of 1853, ch. 90, § 6, 10 Stat. 175. 
423 Colorado Organic Act of 1861, ch. 59, § 6, 12 Stat. 174. 
424 Wyoming Organic Act of 1868, ch. 235, § 6, 15 Stat. 180. 
425 Oklahoma-Indian Territory Act of 1890, ch. 182, § 6, 26 Stat. 84. 
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Local or Special Laws. An act applicable to all territories 
passed in 1867426 provided that "the legislative assemblies of the 
several territories" should not grant "private charters or especial 
privileges," but might permit incorporation for specified pur-
poses by "general incorporation acts." This statute was supple-
mented in 1872.427 In 1885 Congress declared: "[T]he legislatures 
of the Territories of the United States now or hereafter to be 
organized shall not pass local or special laws in any of the follow-
ing enumerated cases .... "428 
After listing two dozen "cases" in which local or special laws 
should not be passed, the statute provided: "In all other cases 
where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall 
be enacted in any of the Territories of the United States by the 
Territorial legislatures thereof."429 
The first of the "cases" listed in the above statute was "grant-
ing divorces." In 1888430 the Supreme Court of the United States 
was called upon to decide the validity of a divorce granted by 
legislative act in Oregon in 1852. After a review of the history 
of legislative divorce, the Court held that power to grant divorces 
was included when Congress provided that Oregon's legislative 
power should "extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not 
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 
A consideration of the validity of a divorce law passed by an un-
incorporated territory is contained in Granville-Smith v. Granville-
Smith.431 
Other Limitations. Limiting provisions other than those 
mentioned above, if listed, would come under the heading "Mis-
cellaneous." An example is the act of 1873432 which prohibited 
compensation to officers or members of any territorial legislature 
"other than that provided by the laws of the United States." An 
illustration of a special limitation on the legislative power of a 
single territory will be found in an act passed in 1887 declaring 
that it should not be lawful for the legislature of Utah to create, 
organize, or recognize an emigrating company.433 
426 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 150, § I, 14 Stat. 426. 
427 Act of June IO, 1872, ch. 434, 17 Stat. 390, amended by 23 Stat. 348 (1885). 
428 24 Stat. 170 (1886), 48 U.S.C. § 1471 (1958). 
429 Ibid. 
430 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
431 349 U.S. 1 (1955). 
432 Act of Jan. 23, 1873, ch. 48, § 4, 17 Stat. 416. 
433 Anti-Polygamy Act of 1887, ch. 397, § 15, 24 Stat. 637. 
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INFLUENCE OF THE FRONTIER 
The Northwest Ordinance (1787)434 provided that the gov-
ernor and judges of the territory should "adopt and publish" 
laws "necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the dis-
trict." 
"This provision evidently refers to the selection of single 
acts from the statutes of the states, with reference to the 
adaptation of each act to the circumstances of a new country. 
It was plainly the intention of Congress, also, that each law 
adopted should be published, that every citizen might know 
the nature and extent of his social obligations. Neither of 
these purposes could be answered by the adoption of the 
English law, written and unwritten, in the mass. Its adapta-
tion to the circumstances of the district could not be ascer-
tained; nor could the citizen be acquainted with its nature 
by publication."485 
This statement, made by Salmon P. Chase while editing the 
Northwest and Ohio statutes in 1833, gives us the prime essentials 
of frontier law: (1) adaptation to frontier conditions, and (2) local 
publication. His reference to "English law, written and unwrit-
ten, in the mass" was to the Northwest Statute of 1795486 (adopted 
from Virginia) which had declared that the common law of Eng-
land and statutes made in aid of the common law prior to 1607 
should be the rule of decision. He stated that it was still a "con-
tested question, whether the English statutes and common law 
acquired a binding force upon the people of the northwest terri-
tory, in consequence of the adoption of this act." 
The Michigan repealing act of 1810 commenced with a pre-
amble (similar to that of the Virginia repealing act of 1792) which 
read: 
"Whereas the good people of the territory of Michigan, 
may be ensnared by ignorance of acts of the parliament of 
England, and of acts of the parliament of Great Britain, which 
are not published among the laws of the territory, and it has 
been thought advisable by the governor and the judges of the 
territory of Michigan, hereafter specially to enact such of the 
said acts as shall appear worthy of adoption .... "437 
484 1 Stat. 51 n.(a). 
485 1 CHASE 190n. 
436 Ibid.; PEASE 253. 
487 1 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 900 (reprint 1871). 
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The emphasis here was on legislative selection, and local publica-
tion. If left to the courts to decide in particular cases which Eng-
lish statutes were to be considered in force, years might pass 
before the inhabitants would know what statute law governed 
their affairs. And in the absence of published court reports the 
judicial selections when made would not be widely known. Even 
when known that a particular English statute had been declared 
in force the text of the statute in most frontier communities 
would be unavailable. The fact that settlers in the territories came 
from different states and could not bring their law with them 
made local publication of all applicable statute law highly desira-
ble, if not essential. 
Keenly aware of the necessity of having all statutory law locally 
available in printed form, the frontier territories were quick to 
adopt codes based on the New York (Field) Code of Procedure of 
1848. Field's Civil Code, rejected in New York, was first adopted 
in Dakota. Congress encouraged local publication by bearing the 
expense.438 
In Part I of this article439 attention was called to observations 
made by Alexis de Tocqueville after conversations with Ohio 
lawyers, including Salmon P. Chase, in 1831: 
"A defective English law (and there are many) is im-
ported into America by the first emigrants. They modify 
it, adapt it after a fashion to their social condition; but they 
still retain for it a superstitious respect, and are unable to 
rid themselves of it entirely. The second emigration takes 
place; these same men plunge once again into the wilderness. 
This time the law is modified in such a way that it has al-
most lost the stamp of its origin. But it requires still a third 
emigration before it ceases to exist."440 
The "second emigration" referred to was out of the original 
states into the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. "Superstitious re-
438 In 1792 Congress provided "That the laws of the territory northwest of the river 
Ohio, that have been or hereafter may be enacted by the governor and judges thereof, 
shall be printed under the direction of the Secretary of State, and two hundred copies 
thereof, together with ten sets of the laws of the United States, shall be delivered to 
the said governor and judges, to be distributed among the inhabitants for their infor-
mation ••• .'' Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 42, § I, I Stat. 285. In 1872 expense for printing 
laws, journals, etc., for any session of a territorial legislature was limited to $4,000. 
Appropriations Act of 1872, ch. 140, 17 Stat. 73. POMEROY, THE TERRITORIES AND THE 
UNITED STATES 1861-1890-STUDIES IN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION 45 (1947), states: "Legis-
latures expected and sometimes received contributions toward large printing bills, as 
for revisions and codes of laws." 
430 Blume&: Brown, Territorial Courts and Law: I, 61 MICH. L. REv. 39 (1962). 
440 Id. at 89. 
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spect" for English law was no doubt lost in this great migration, 
but the law in force lacked much of losing "the stamp of its 
origin." And the same was true of the "third emigration" out of 
the Mississippi Valley to the Pacific. Persons willing to leave 
settled communities with their established legal systems were 
ready to make adjustments to new physical conditions, and were 
not inclined to hesitate to change the law of their ancestors to 
meet those conditions. 
In an address to the Wisconsin Bar Association in 1921 on 
the "Influence of Frontier Life on the Development of American 
Law," Professor Frederick L. Paxon stated: 
"In older settled, established communities we put up 
with obsolete conditions, with laws that cease to fulfill a 
useful purpose, with institutions that have become cum-
bersome instead of profitable. We keep putting up with 
them, because to change would be an annoyance and a nui-
sance, and because one can never be quite sure in lopping 
off a governmental appendix. that something else won't be 
lopped off with it that will leave the system weaker instead 
of stronger for the operation. But in these new communities, 
where they started with a great long table and a big white 
sheet of paper and abundance of ink, with no solicitation as 
to what they should write or should not, it was easy to cut out 
institutions of government and to substitute others that they 
desired and approved. The 13 colonies did this, and then 
after independence they allowed every new colony to do the 
same."441 
Insofar as this statement implies that "every new colony" was 
free to pass any laws it saw fit, it is misleading, and cannot be 
supported. Territorial legislative power was restricted in extent, 
and all laws passed were subject to disapproval by Congress. In 
some of the early territories laws could not be "made" but had to 
be "adopted" from original states. It was true, however, that the 
organization of each new territorial government meant a new 
consideration of what law should be in force. And as suggested 
by Professor Paxon there were no established institutions which 
the legislators might hesitate to change. 
Looking beyond particular developments such as mining and 
441 13 PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE BAR AssocIATION OF WISCONSIN 477, 484 (1921); 
quoted in part in AUlliANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: SOME SELECTED 
PHASES 15 (1940); not included in PAXON, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER (student 
ed. 1924). 
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water laws made by trespassers to regulate the affairs of trespassers, 
and detailed modification of rules originally English to suit fron-
tier conditions, we find two general attitudes and resultant in-
fluences attributable to frontier life: (1) A strong desire to have 
all statute law published locally so that reliance on laws not 
available on the frontier would be unnecessary--codes were wel-
come; (2) A lack of "superstitious respect" for old laws and legal 
institutions; in other words, a readiness to make changes to suit 
new conditions. 
APPENDIX 
The Virginia "revisals" initiated by Jefferson required a rewriting of all English 
statutes considered "worthy of adoption." (See text at note 350 supra.) The extent to 
which the subject matter of English statutes was covered by Virginia revised statutes 
is indicated by the following side-margin references in the Virginia Revised Code 1819 
(2 vols.) to "the English statutes in pari materia." References are to volume and page 
of the Code. Dates and references in parentheses are added to conform to Statutes of 
the Realm. References to the sections of the English statutes are omitted. 
9 Hen.3 (1224-5) 
Magna carta 
c.7, Dower, I:403 
c.29(39), Judgment of peers, I:595 
20 Hen.3 (1235-6) 
St.Merton 
c.l, Dower, I:403 
52 Hen.3 (1267) 
St.Marlb. 
c.3, Distress, I:447 
c.4, Distress, I:453 
c.24(23), Waste, I:462 
3 Edw.l (1275) 
St.Westm.l 
c.10, Coroners, I:286 
c.26, Extortion, I:560 
c.27, Extortion, I:560 
c.30, Extortion, I:560 
c.49, Dower, I:403 
4 Edw.l (1275-6) 
St.2 Off.Coron. 
Coroners, I:288,290 
St.2 Glouc. (Bigamy) 
c.6, Warranty, I:368 
6 Edw.l (1278) 
St.Glouc. 
c.(l) Costs, I:474 
c.5, Waste, I:463 
13 Edw.l (1285) 
St.Westm.2 
c.3, Right of entry, I:514 
c.4, Dower, I:404 
c.4, Reversion, I:514 
c.7, Dower, I:404 
c.14, Waste, I:463 
c.18, Elegit, I:525 
c.22, ·waste, I:463 
c.31, Bill of exceptions, I:523 
c.34, Rape, I:585 
c.34(4), Dower, I:404 
20 Edw.l (1291-2) 
St.2 St. Waste 
Waste, 1:463 
33 Edw.1 (1305) 
(Ord. de conspir.) 
St.2, Conspirators, I:558 
St.2, Champerty, I:558 
St.3, Champerty, I:558 
34 Edw.l (1306) 
St.de conjunc.feoff. 
St.I, Plea of joint-tenancy, I:496 
4 Edw.2, St.2, I:288 (should read: 4 Edw.l, 
St. 2, Coroners) 
2 Edw.3 (1328) 
St.Northamp. 
c.3, Affrays, I:554 
4 Edw.3 (1330) 
c.7, Action for wrongs done to decedent, 
I:390 
5 Edw.3 (1331) 
c.10, Embracery, I:572 
14 Edw.3 (1340) 
St.I 
c.6, Jeofails, I:512 
c.8, Escheators, I:294 
25 Edw.3 (1351-2) 
St.1(5) 
c.16, Abatement, I:496 
St.5 
c.2, Treason, I:591 
c.5, Executors, I:390 
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27 Edw.3 (1353) 
St.2 
c.10, Weights and measures, II:119 
28 Edw. (1354) 
c.6, Coroners, I:286 
31 Edw.3 (1357) (St.I) 
c.11, Administrators, I:382 
34 Edw.3 (1360-1) 
c.8, Embracery, I:572 
c.13, Escheators, I:294 
36 Edw.3 (1362) 
c.18(13), Escheators, I:295 
38 Edw.3 (1363-4) 
St.I 
c.12, Embracery, I:572 
42 Edw.3 (1368) 
c.5, Escheators, I:294 
5 Rich.2 (1381) 
(St.I) 
c.8(7), Forcible entries, I:455 footnote 
13 Rich.2 (1389-90) 
(St.I) 
c.9, Weights and measures, II:119 
15 Rich.2 (1391) 
c.2, Forcible entries, I:455 footnote 
c.4, Weights and measures, II:119 
16 Rich.2 (1392-3) 
c.3, Weights and measures, II:119 
13 Hen.4 (1411) 
c.7, Riots, 1:556 
7 Hen.5 (1419) 
(c.l), Conspirators, 1:558 
9 Hen.5 (1421) 
(St.I) 
c.4, Jeofails, I:512 
8 Hen.6 (I 429) 
c.5, Weights and measures, II:119 
c.9, Forcible entries, 1:455 footnote 
c.12, Jeofails, I:512 
c.15, Jeofails, 1:512 
c.16, Escheators, I:294,295,296 
6(11) Hen.6 (1433) 
c.5, Waste, 1:463 
11 Hen.6 (1433) 
c.8, Weights and measures, II:119 
18 Hen.6 (1439) 
c.7, Escheators, 1:294 
3 Hen.7 (1487) 
c.2, Abduction, 1:402 
3 Hen.8(7} (1487} 
c.10, Expos.St.Glouc.,Costs, I:494 
4 Hen.7 (1488-9) 
c.20, Actions popular, 1:615 
11 Hen.7 (1495) 
c.7(4), Weights and measures, II:119 
c.12, Pauper suits, 1:481 
12 Hen.7 (1496-7) 
c.5, Weights and measures, II:119 
19 Hen.7 (1503-4) 
c.13, Riots, 1:557 
c.20, Expos.St.Glouc., Costs, I: 494 
1 Hen.8 (1509-10) 
c.8, Escheators, 1:294 
c.10, Escheators, 1:295,298 
21 Hen.8 (1529) 
c.4, Executors, 1:388 
c.5, Administrators, 1:382 
23 Hen.8 (1531-2) 
c.15, Costs, 1:481,494 
24 Hen.8 (1532-3) 
c.8, Costs, 1:494 
25 Hen.8 (1533-4) 
c.6, Buggery, 1:586 
27 Hen.8 (1535-6) 
c.10, Uses, I:370 
c.10, Dower, I:404,405 
31 Hen.8 (1539) 
c.l, Partition, 1:359 
32 Hen.8 (1540) 
c.l, Wills, 1:375 
c.2, Limitations, 1:488 
c.5, Executions, 1:527 
c.9, Maintenance, 1:375 
c.28, Right of entry, 1:514 
c.30, Jeofails, 1:511 
c.32, Partition, 1:359 
c.33, Right of entry, 1:514 
c.34, Reversions, 1:452 
c.37, Executors; Distress, 1:453 
33 Hen.8 (1541-2) 
c.l, Counterfeiting, 1:577 
34 &: 35 Hen.8 (1542-3) 
c.5, Wills, I:375 
37 Hen.8 (1545) 
c.8, Horse-stealers, 1:575 
c.9, Usury, 1:374 
1 Edw.6 (1547) 
c.12, Horse-stealers, 1:575 
c.12, Treason, 1:591 
2 &: 3 Edw.6 (1548) 
c.8, Escheators, 1:298 
c.32, perpetuating 32 Hen.8, c.30, Jeo-
fails, 1:511 
c.33, Horse-stealers, 1:575 
5 &: 6 Edw.6 (1551-2) 
c.11, Treason, 1:591 
c.16, Buying and selling offices, 1:559 
1 &: 2 Phil. and Mar. (1554 &: 1554-5) 
c.13, Coroners, 1:290 
4&:5 Phil. and Mar. (1557-8) 
c.8, Abduction, 1:402 
5 Eliz. (1562-3) 
c.9, Witnesses, 1:517 
c.9, Perjury, 1:571 
c.17, perpetuates 25 Hen.8, c.6, Bug-
gery, 1:586 
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13 Eliz. (1571) 
c.5, Fraudulent conveyances, I:372,373 
c.8, Usury, I:374 
18 Eliz. (1575-6) 
c.5, Compounding offenses, I:616 
c.7, Rape, I:585 
c.14, perpetuates 32 Hen.8, c.30, Jeo-
fails, I :511 
27 Eliz. (1584-5) 
c.4, Fraudulent conveyances, I:372,373 
c.5, Jeofails, I:511 
31 Eliz. (1588-9) 
c.11, Forcible entries, I:455 footnote 
29(39) Eliz. (1597-8) 
c.18, Usury, I:374 
43 Eliz. (1601) 
c.6, Costs, I:493 
I Jae.I (1603-4) 
c.11, Bigamy, I:400 
4 Jae.I (1606-7) 
c.3, Expos.St.Glaue. 6 Ed.I, Costs, I:494 
21 Jae.I (1623-4) 
c.13, perpetuates 32 Hen.8, c.30, Jeofails, 
I:511 
c.15, Forcible entries, I:455 footnote 
c.16, Limitations, I:487,488,490,491 
c.16, Costs; Vexatious suits, I:493 
c.17, Usury, I:374 
c.24, Executions, I:528 
3 Car.I (1627) 
c.4(5), Usury, I:374 
c.4(5), continues 43 Eliz., c.6, Costs, 
I:493 
16 Car.I (1640) 
c.4, continues 43 Eliz., c.6, Costs, I:493 
12 Car.2 (1660) 
c.24, Guardians, I:405 
16 Car.2 (1664) 
c.7, Gaming, I:563,564 
16&:17 Car. 2 (1664&:5) 
c.5, Executions, I:527,528 
c.8, perpetuates 32 Hen.8, c.30, Jeofails, 
I:511 
22 Car.2 (1670) 
c.8, Weights and measures, II:119 
22 &: 23 Car.2 (1670 &: 1) 
c.2, perpetuating 16 &: 17 Car.2, c.5, Ex-
ecutions, I:527 
c.9, Costs, I:493 
c.10, Intestacy, I:383,383,389 
c.12, Weights and measures, II:119 
29 Car.2 (1677) 
c.3, Trusts, I:370 
c.3, Executions, 1:529 
c.3, Frauds, I:372 
c.3, Wills, I:375,376,377,379,389 
c.3, Intestacy, I:382, 389 
c.7, Process on Sunday, I:281 
30 Car.2 (1678) 
c.7, Executors, I:390 
31 Car.2 (1679) 
c.2, Habeas corpus, I:468,469,470 
32(31) Car.2 (1679) 
c.2, Habeas corpus, I:471 
I J ac.2 (1685) 
c.17, Intestacy, I:382 
2 Gui. &: Mar. (1689) 
St.I 
c.5, Distress, I:446,447 
3 Gui. & Mar. (1691) 
c.4(14), Fraudulent devises, I:391,392,393 
4 & 5(4) Gui. &: Mar. (1692) 
c.24, Executors, I:390 
6 Gul.3 (6 & 7 Gul. & Mar.) (1694) 
c.14, perpetuating 3 Gui. & Mar. c.4(14), 
Fraudulent devises, I:391 
7(& 8) Gul.3 (1695-6) 
c.3, Treason, I:591 
8 & 9 Gul.3 (1696-7) 
c.11, Costs, I:493 
c.11, Abatement, I:497 
c.11, Vexatious suits, I:509 
c.31, Partition, I:360 
9 & 10(9) Gul.3 (1697-8) 
c.15, Arbitration, I:454 
c.17, Bills of exchange, I:483 
IO Gul.3 (1698) 
c.14(2), Limitations, I:493 
10& 11(10) Gul.3 (1698) 
c.16(22), Contingent remainder, I:369 
13 & 14(11) Gul.3 (1698-9) 
c.15, Weights and measures, II:119 
1 Ann. (1702) 
St.I 
c.15, Weights and measures, II:119 
St.2 
c.9 Accessaries, I:589 
4(& 5) Ann. (1705) 
c.16(3), Warranty, I:368 
c.16(3), Reversions, I:370 
c.16(3), Limitations, I:491 
c.16(3), Actions of account, I:509 
4 & 5 Ann. (1705) 
c.16(3), Actions on bonds, I:509 
c.16(3), Pleading several matters, I:510 
c.16(3), perpetuates 32 Hen.8, c.30, Jeo-
fails, I:511 
5(6) Ann. (1706) 
c.31, Accessaries, I:589 
7 Ann. (1708) 
c.19, Deeds, I:204 
c.19, Guardians, I:408 
8 Ann. (1709) 
c.14(18), Distress, I:488,450,451 
9 Ann. (l710) 
c.14(19), Gaming, I:561,562,563,564 
12(13) Ann. (l713) 
St.2 
c.16(15) Usury, I:374 
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12 Geo.I (1725)• 
c.29, Process, I:499 
2 Geo.2 (1729)• 
c.22, Set-off, I:487, 510 
5 Geo.2 (1732)• 
c.13(?), Jeofails, I:512 
c.25, Pro confesso, I:214 
8 Geo.2 (1735)• 
c.24, Set-off, I:487,510 
II Geo.2 (1728)• 
c.19, Attomment, I:370 
c.19, Distress, I:450 
c.19, Replevin, I:451 
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14 Geo.2 (1741)• 
c.20, Intestacy; Wills, I:389 
18 Geo.2 (1745)• 
c.34, Gaming, I:562 
21 Geo.2 (1748)• 
c.27(3), perpetuates 12 Geo.I, c.29, Proc-
ess, I:499 
25 Geo.2 (1752)• 
c.6, Wills, I:377 
29 Geo.2 (1756)• 
c.31, Guardians, I:408,417 
30 Geo.2 (1757)• 
c.24(?), Gaming, I:563 
• Subsequent to Statutes of the Realm. Dates and references in parentheses added 
to conform to Statutes at Large. 
